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ABSTRACT 
 The United States is reliant on the capabilities provided by satellite technology for 
nearly every facet of society. A sustained loss of satellite capabilities due to any service 
outages will have a significant negative impact on the nation’s homeland security. The 
areas affected include communication, financial transactions, intelligence gathering, 
internet access, and weather surveillance. Existing domestic and international policy has 
been insufficient in managing debris growth. The removal of large debris from congested 
orbits through active debris removal (ADR) is now necessary to prevent future collision 
events that will damage or destroy operational satellites that may possibly render certain 
regions of space unusable for generations. To safeguard its satellites and critical services 
they provide to homeland security, the United States should develop a domestic debris 
removal program using the established public–private partnership model that NASA has 
leveraged over the previous 15 years. This model has reduced developments costs and 
risks of schedule delays, and also stimulates growth in the private space sector and 
creates additional tax revenues. Furthermore, the commercial sector possesses knowledge 
and experience in the field of on-orbit servicing, a field with similar technical challenges 
to debris removal that can provide a foundation for the development of ADR systems. 
The United States must begin remediation by partnering with the private sector. 
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Uncontrolled debris in orbit poses the greatest risk to U.S. satellites in orbit and the 
capabilities they provide. A sustained loss of services provided by satellite technology will 
have a significant negative impact on the nation’s homeland security. The areas impacted 
include communication, financial transactions, intelligence gathering, internet access, and 
weather surveillance.1 Domestic and international policy decisions have been ineffective 
in slowing the growth of the debris population. This ineffectiveness has created an orbital 
environment in which the removal of large debris from congested orbits through active 
debris removal (ADR) is now necessary to prevent future collision events that will damage 
or destroy operational satellites and may possibly render certain regions of space unusable 
for generations. The National Space Council needs to develop a domestic ADR program 
to begin removing the most dangerous debris objects from orbit to mitigate the threat debris 
poses to U.S. assets in space. 
The United States has been slow to act regarding debris remediation due to policy 
decisions. The United States was the first nation to generate a list of best practices to reduce 
debris-generating events known as mitigation standard practices.2 However, these 
practices were not mandated and were therefore unenforceable. Complying with these 
standards may have resulted in a financial burden to satellite operators who may need to 
carry extra fuel to deorbit their satellite upon its end-of-life. Other nations and the United 
Nations (UN) eventually adopted mitigation practices as well; however, international 
community compliance with these practices has been lacking.3 This lack of compliance 
 
1 Bryce Space and Technology, Satellites Key to $5T+ Across U.S. Economy (Alexandria, VA: Bryce 
Space and Technology, 2019), 2, https://brycetech.com/reports; Chadwick D. Igl et al., “568 Balls in the 
Air: Planning for the Loss of Space Capabilities,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 90 (2018): 2, 
https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-90/jfq-90_24-29_igl-et-al.pdf?ver=2018-04-11-125441-
307. 
2 J.-C. Liou, “Orbital Debris Briefing” (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President/Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (EOP/OSTP) Briefing, December 8, 2017), 4, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/
citations/20170011662. 
3 J.-C. Liou, “Orbital Debris Briefing,” 9; ESA Space Debris Office, ESA’s Annual Space 
Environment Report (Darmstadt, Germany: European Space Agency, 2020), 87, 
https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf. 
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has contributed significantly to the current state of the debris population. The United States 
is aware the debris population is growing and mitigation alone is insufficient, yet no policy 
action has been taken to combat this threat. The current orbital environment is at risk of 
experiencing one or more catastrophic collision events, yet no action has been taken to 
prevent it. Congress must pass a Clean Space Act to establish regulatory authority to 
enforce mitigation standards and fund a domestic remediation program. 
NASA developed the public–private partnership model for the Commercial Orbital 
Transportation Services (COTS) program. The goal of this effort was to provide cargo 
resupply services to the international space station (ISS) following the retirement of the 
space shuttle in 2010.4 Following directives from the Bush Administration to turn over 
routine services to the commercial sector, NASA selected Space Exploration Technologies 
Corporation (SpaceX) and Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital Sciences) as partners in 
developing resupply spacecraft. An analysis conducted within NASA found this program 
model resulted in significantly lower development costs for the required spacecraft.5 An 
example is the development of the SpaceX Falcon 9 booster, which was developed at a 
cost of one-quarter of the best estimate of previous NASA methods.6 Furthermore. the fact 
that the commercial partners retained ownership of the systems developed within the 
program allowed these systems to be sold commercially. Thus, commercial partners 
received additional revenue, which created new jobs and tax revenue. Research shows the 
tax revenue from follow-on commercial sales of these systems has paid for initial public 
investment in these systems.7 The success of COTS led to public–private partnerships 
 
4 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Commercial Orbital Transportation Services: A 
New Era in Spaceflight, Illustrated (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 2. 
5 Edgar Zapata, “An Assessment of Cost Improvements in the NASA COTS—CRS Program and 
Implications for Future NASA Missions,” in AIAA Space 2017 Conference (Orlando, FL: American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2017), 23, 24, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170008895. 
6 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Falcon 9 Launch Vehicle NAFCOM Cost Estimates 
(Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011), 8–9, https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
586023main_8-3-11_NAFCOM.pdf. 
7 Zapata, “An Assessment of Cost Improvements in the NASA COTS,” 25. 
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being used in the Commercial Crew and Lunar Artemis programs currently under 
development.8 
NASA’s investment into the commercial space sector has resulted in greater 
competition and new innovation in a once stagnant sector. Large aerospace companies 
launching mainly government payloads had dominated the commercial launch industry. 
The lack of a diverse customer base and competition kept launch prices high.9 The entry 
of SpaceX, Blue Origin, Rocket Lab, and others has forced established launch providers, 
such as United Launch Alliance (ULA), to innovate and evolve to stay competitive.10 This 
new marketplace and resulting innovation provide a strong pool of talent for NASA with 
which to partner. Additionally, the private sector has achieved great success in the related 
field of on-orbit servicing (OOS), a mission that requires similar capabilities to that of ADR 
missions. Northrop Grumman’s subsidiary SpaceLogistics has demonstrated an 
operational capability to rendezvous and dock with satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit 
(GEO) with its mission extension vehicle (MEV).11 This spacecraft’s success has resulted 
in a partnership with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop 
a spacecraft capable of servicing satellites in GEO to provide further evidence that the 
strength of the commercial sector can be leveraged to pursue complex space capabilities.12 
The goal of this remediation partnership should be the remediation of U.S.-owned 
debris objects between 775 km and 1,500 km in altitude. Four separate orbits appear 
 
8 Sean Potter, “NASA Astronauts Launch from America in Test of SpaceX Crew Dragon,” National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 30, 2020, http://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-astronauts-
launch-from-america-in-historic-test-flight-of-spacex-crew-dragon; and “NASA Announces New Moon 
Partnerships with U.S. Companies,” November 29, 2018, NASA, YouTube, video, 3:20, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2TfS_ckxjA. 
9 Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Commercial Space Opportunities 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 54, ProQuest; Bruce D. Berkowitz, 
“Energizing the Space Launch Industry,” Issues in Science and Technology 6, no. 2 (1989): 79–80. 
10 Irene Klotz, “SpaceX Undercut ULA Rocket Launch Pricing by 40 Percent: U.S. Air Force,” 
Reuters, April 28, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-spacex-launch-ula-idUSKCN0XP2T2. 
11 Elizabeth Howell, “Two Private Satellites Just Docked in Space in Historic First for Orbital 
Servicing,” Space, February 27, 2020, https://www.space.com/private-satellites-docking-success-northrop-
grumman-mev-1.html. 
12 Sandra Erwin, “DARPA Picks Northrop Grumman as Its Commercial Partner for Satellite Servicing 
Program,” SpaceNews, March 4, 2020, https://spacenews.com/darpa-picks-northrop-grumman-as-its-
commercial-partner-for-satellite-servicing-program/. 
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between these altitudes that present different risks; however, the literature shows this area 
of space has the highest likelihood of collision along with producing the most catastrophic 
collisions regarding the amount of debris generated.13 Targeting only U.S.-owned debris 
prevents the violation of established international agreements and will allow for a quicker 
development of capabilities, as well as for potential future expansion internationally. 
Between inoperable satellites and derelict rocket bodies, the United States owns 41 objects 
at these altitudes that pose a collision risk.14 These objects are the initial target list for the 
program. While related literature states multiple objects need to be remediated to reduce 
the risk of collision, this program must focus on the removal of these objects due to their 
mass and the population density of debris in these orbits.15 Any capabilities developed in 
the program can be scaled up later to achieve the desired frequency of remediation missions 
while pursuing international cooperation to clear foreign debris objects in orbit. 
The framework for a domestic ADR program should be a public–private 
partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the 
commercial space sector. NASA has used this model of program management and 
technology development over the last 15 years. This partnership model, where both NASA 
and participating commercial partners share the development costs of program spacecraft, 
has reduced costs through reduced public sector oversight and leveraging private sector 
innovation and construction efficiency.16 Additionally, the framework of the partnership 
allows the commercial partner to retain ownership of the developed systems that allows 
partners to sell services commercially using these systems.17 These benefits are not 
 
13 A. Rossi, A. Petit, and D. McKnight, “Examining Short-Term Space Safety Effects from LEO 
Constellations and Clusters,” v. 2109, in First International Orbital Debris Conference (Sugar Land, TX: 
Lunar Planetary Institute, 2019), 3, https://www.hou.usra.edu/meetings/orbitaldebris2019/orbital2019paper/
pdf/6010.pdf. 
14 Darren McKnight, Rohit Arora, and Rachel Witner, “Intact Derelict Deposition Study,” in First 
International Orbital Debris Conference (Sugar Land, TX: Lunar Planetary Institute, 2019), 6, 
https://www.hou.usra.edu/meetings/orbitaldebris2019/orbital2019paper/pdf/6011.pdf. 
15 Donald J. Kessler et al., “The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space Operations,” 
Advances in Astronautical Sciences 137, no. 8 (2010): 14; Rossi, Petit, and McKnight, “Examining Short-
Term Space Safety Effects,” 8. 
16 Zapata, “An Assessment of Cost Improvements in the NASA COTS,” 23–24. 
17 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Commercial Orbital Transportation Services, 12, 
22. 
xv 
possible in a traditional NASA program when systems are procured from the commercial 
sector using FAR contracts and specific design specifications. 
A partnership with the private sector has the ability to reduce the threat of debris to 
American satellites. It will also allow the United States to maintain its role as a leader in 
space and demonstrate good stewardship of the orbital environment. This partnership will 
also open up new markets and revenue streams in the field of remediation services. The 
number of commercial satellites being launched is growing, and remediation services may 
become a large component of the commercial space market. A partnership will allow U.S. 
companies to take leadership in this effort and keep jobs and tax revenue in the country 
instead of overseas. The result of this partnership will be a safer environment for U.S. 
satellites and will jump-start U.S. commercial space companies in the ADR marketplace. 
Inaction will result in an ever-increasing likelihood that satellite services will be 
compromised as the number of satellites in orbits grows. The United States needs to begin 
remediation and should partner with the private sector. 
A catastrophic collision in orbit and the resulting fragmentation could impact the 
space around the planet for generations. This type of collision is not unlike a nuclear 
meltdown accident or environmental oil spill. Those events have the capability of rendering 
areas uninhabitable for generations. A series of cascading collisions could do the same to 
the space around the Earth, only this area would be uninhabitable by satellites. A 
degradation of services in nearly all aspects of modern life would be the result. Experts are 
warning the United States about this type of disaster and state immediate action is needed 
to prevent such an event. Congress and NASA have the resources and the authority to act. 
It is their responsibility to act in the best interest of the public, as it is negligent to leave 
America’s critical space-based assets vulnerable to this known threat. The U.S. government 
cannot plead ignorance on this issue. In the event that such a collision event would occur, 
the public would want to know why more was not done to prevent such a catastrophe; 
especially one that experts warned was possible. The United States must begin the 
development of an ADR capability, and the public–private partnership model established 
by NASA should be the framework for that effort. 
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Satellite technologies have penetrated nearly every level of modern society. As the 
capabilities of satellites grew, these technologies improved efficiency across many sectors 
of private industry and government services. The services that satellites in orbit provide 
include many capabilities critical to U.S. homeland security. I have been passionate about 
space exploration for many years. Thus, when I began my studies in homeland security, I 
naturally gravitated to space-related topics. Such key homeland security issues as effective 
communication during crises and weather observation capabilities in an era of ever-
increasing hazardous weather, as well as intelligence services provided to defense officials 
and policy makers, all depend on satellite technologies. While the high levels of radiation 
in orbit or state-actors using offensive action can possibly put a satellite out of commission, 
uncontrolled debris in space is the most immediate threat that may lead to a collision 
between debris and operational satellites, and perhaps cripple whole networks.  
This topic features prominently in the area of space research, but little scholarship 
examines this threat from a homeland security perspective. Thus, this thesis represents my 
efforts to research the threat that debris poses to U.S. assets in space and to provide a 
solution based on evidence gathered from both public and private U.S. space operations. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
After establishing the risk that debris poses to satellites, the next step is to find a 
solution to this challenge. After examining the relevant research related to debris and the 
lack of a reason for a concentrated effort to removing it, the following questions were 
developed: 
• How can the United States begin removal operations of orbital debris?  
• How does the United States overcome the associated technical, legal, and 
policy challenges associated with such an endeavor? 
2 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To generate a strong knowledge base on the issues related to the threat of space 
debris, my review of the relevant literature spanned the risk space debris poses, the effect 
of a loss of satellite capabilities on homeland security, domestic and international efforts 
from both national space agencies and governments, and the efficacy of international 
agreements regarding space debris. All the research reviewed for this thesis is open source. 
The literature paints a picture in which both commercial actors and nation-states 
acknowledge that space debris is a threat to satellites in orbit and the capabilities they 
provide. Furthermore. my review led to the discovery of success within domestic space 
programs in partnering with the commercial space sector in recent initiatives. This 
discovery led me to research the effectiveness of a public–private partnership to address 
complex challenges. The literature illustrates how this management framework can be 
successful under the right parameters. 
Significant research has been conducted on the growth in the debris population in 
orbit from both the public and private sector. The foundational document in modern debris 
research is a 1978 article by Kessler and Cour-Palais. This article states that it is possible 
for the debris population to grow to a point where a series of cascading collisions may 
occur that can exponentially increase the amount of debris around the Earth.1 Once this 
series of collisions reaches a critical point, the effects become irreversible that then render 
affected orbits unusable.2 Subsequent researchers have called this event the “Kessler 
Syndrome.”3 Research by NASA’s Orbital Debris office shows that the amount of debris 
fragments and total mass in orbit is increasing with “no signs of slowing down.”4 Further 
 
1 Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour‐Palais, “Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The 
Creation of a Debris Belt,” Journal of Geophysical Research: Space Physics 83, no. A6 (1978): 2637, 
https://doi.org/10.1029/JA083iA06p02637.  
2 Joseph Kurt, “Triumph of the Space Commons: Addressing the Impending Space Debris Crisis 
without an International Treaty,” William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 40, no. 1 (2015): 
309.  
3 Louis de Gouyon Matignon, “The Kessler Syndrome and Space Debris,” Space Legal Issues (blog), 
March 27, 2019, https://www.spacelegalissues.com/space-law-the-kessler-syndrome/. 
4 J.-C. Liou, “Risk from Orbital Debris” (RAS Specialist Discussion Meeting on Space Dust and 
Debris in the Vicinity of the Earth, London, United Kingdom, November 9, 2018), 7–8, 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20180008560/downloads/20180008560.pdf. 
3 
research by Kessler, Liou, Rossi, Petit, McKnight, Hakima, and Emami, all illustrate that 
the volume of debris in orbit has reached a point where debris objects need to be removed 
to prevent future collision events.5 These studies illustrate how mitigation efforts, practices 
designed to limit the amount of debris generated by space operations, have not kept up with 
debris generating behaviors. A growing body of literature also appears both in journal 
articles and NASA research showing that the deployment of very-large satellite 
constellations in low-earth orbit (LEO), such as SpaceX’s Starlink constellation that may 
grow to 42,000 satellites, will increase the likelihood of future collision events and require 
either more stringent mitigation standards or the implementation of remediation missions.6 
The total number of spacecrafts being launched annually is increasing explosively. 
According to Bryce Space and Technology, 1,085 spacecraft were launched into orbit in 
2020 as of October 31.7 This figure is approximately double the number from the previous 
year, which itself was a record.8 The current state of the debris population and the growing 
number of satellites in orbit now present a situation in which five debris objects a year must 
be removed in conjunction with a 90-percent compliance rate to debris mitigation 
practices.9 
 
5 Donald J. Kessler et al., “The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space Operations, 14; A. 
Rossi, A. Petit, and D. McKnight, “Examining Short-Term Space Safety Effects from LEO Constellations 
and Clusters,” v. 2109, in First International Orbital Debris Conference (Sugar Land, TX: Lunar Planetary 
Institute, 2019), 8, https://www.hou.usra.edu/meetings/orbitaldebris2019/orbital2019paper/pdf/6010.pdf, 
https://www.hou.usra.edu/meetings/orbitaldebris2019/orbital2019paper/pdf/6010.pdf; and Houman Hakima 
and M. Reza Emami, “Assessment of Active Methods for Removal of LEO Debris,” Acta Astronautica 144 
(March 2018): 225, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2017.12.036.  
6 Veronica L. Foreman, Afreen Siddiqi, and Olivier L. de Weck, “Large Constellation Orbital Debris 
Impacts: Case Studies of OneWeb and SpaceX Proposals,” in Proceedings of the AIAA SPACE and 
Astronautics Forum and Exposition (Orlando: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2017), 
13–14, https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2017-5200; B. Bastida Virgili et al., “Risk to Space Sustainability from 
Large Constellations of Satellites,” Acta Astronautica 126 (September 2016): 154, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.actaastro.2016.03.034; Hugh Lewis et al., “Sensitivity of the Space Debris Environment to Large 
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While the growth in the debris population is well documented, those statistics do 
not paint a complete picture of the nature of the threat. Not only is the total amount of 
debris significant, but also the concentration of debris within specific orbital altitudes and 
the mass of individual debris objects represent the greatest threat of collision in orbit. The 
literature describes where dangerous debris exists and which states are responsible. 
Research by McKnight, Arora, and Witner provides statistics on debris location and 
ownership. Their research found that the United States is responsible for 22.5 percent of 
the large debris objects in the longest-lived orbits around the Earth.10 Separate research by 
Rossi, Petit, and McKnight identify four orbital altitudes that pose a significant risk of 
collision: 775 km, 850 km, 975 km, and 1,500 km.11 The literature illustrates that close 
approaches between debris objects in these four orbits occur 1,000 times annually; with the 
highest likelihood of collision occurring at 975 km.12 Within the 975 km orbit, monthly 
near misses occur with a higher probability of collision than was calculated prior to the 
collision of the Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 satellites in 2009. This event generated 4,500 
tracked debris objects and approximately 60,000 lethal non-trackable (LNT) objects.13  
Each one of these orbits poses a different risk. For example, a collision at 775 km 
would affect the most operational satellites whereas a collision at 850 km would be the 
most consequential given the mass of the objects in that orbit.14 The research by Rossi et 
al. specifically shows that a collision in the 850 km orbit would have an average mass of 
up to 18,000 kg that would generate approximately 16,000 new debris objects large enough 
to track, and another 200,000 LNT objects.15 These massive objects include rocket bodies, 
payload adapters, and derelict satellites. Collisions at this altitude, while not as likely as 
the 975 km orbit, are considered more consequential due to the larger average mass of 
debris objects, and therefore, the more fragments that would be generated during a collision 
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event. Collisions within the 1,500 km altitude have the lowest probability of collision, but 
debris generated at this altitude would be the longest lived of the four altitudes.16 As a 
whole, this literature provides the needed data on where remediation missions would be 
the most effective, which is an important component of any future remediation efforts. 
A significant body of research is available on the economic value the services the 
satellite industry provides to the global economy at large. Satellite technology has 
penetrated many aspects of modern society. With increased reliance on the capabilities 
these technologies provide, the repercussions of any loss of these capabilities increases as 
well. Bryce Space and Technology has conducted several studies on spending and 
economic drivers related to satellite technology. A 2019 report from Bryce found that 
satellite technology was a driver in $5 trillion in annual revenues across the U.S. 
economy.17 The satellite capabilities found to strongly impact the economy include 
wireless communications services, satellite television distribution, precision timing 
services for financial institutions, global positioning system (GPS) navigation capabilities, 
and weather surveillance.18 This report demonstrates that several sectors of the U.S. 
economy would be negatively impacted if significant collision events occurred limiting the 
United States’ access to space. 
The literature reviewed for this thesis also demonstrated that satellites are key to 
U.S. national security. In a 2018 article by Igl, Smith, Fowler, and Angermann, the authors 
found that the U.S. Department of Defense relied on satellite capabilities for 
communication, precision targeting, navigation, and imagery for intelligence.19 In 
addition, the authors also illustrated how potential adversaries in Russia and China have 
identified U.S. reliance on satellites for military capabilities and have established plans to 
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neutralize these capabilities at the outset of hostilities.20 Satellites are not only critical to 
national security by way of defense but also several sectors identified as critical 
infrastructure by the Department of Homeland Security rely on satellites technologies.21 
A journal article by Gheorghe et al. expands on this topic further by stating that reliance 
on satellites has become so prevalent in modern society that satellite constellations 
themselves should be identified as critical infrastructure.22 This literature demonstrates 
that a loss of satellite capabilities can have serious national security implications that affect 
the United States’ defense capabilities and functions of identified critical infrastructure. 
Outside of the disruption to the nation’s defense and homeland security, a sustained 
GPS outage can cause significant damage to the American economy. Many U.S. industries 
rely on the capabilities provided by GPS. In other words, any sustained disruption of 
service will have ripple effects across all sectors of the economy. Leveson’s report on the 
value GPS provides to the civilian market states that commercial agriculture, construction, 
surveying, timing services, and all modes of commercial transportation comprise an 
approximate $55.7 billion benefit to these industries.23 Research by the Boston Consulting 
Group affirms Leveson’s research and shows that GPS capabilities drove $1.6 trillion in 
U.S. revenue in 2012.24 In a 2012 report, Pham quantified the financial losses that would 
occur if GPS capabilities were lost and showed that a 50 percent loss of GPS capabilities 
would result in a $48.3 billion loss to the economy; a total loss would result in a $96 billion 
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reduction.25 The combined body of research reviewed for this thesis demonstrates the U.S. 
economy greatly relies on satellite-based technologies, and losing these capabilities will 
significantly impact several sectors. The GPS satellites themselves reside in an orbital 
region designated as medium earth orbit (MEO), at an approximate altitude of 20,000 
km.26 The risk of collision with debris in this orbital region is lower than in LEO given the 
quantity of debris present at this altitude is lower.27 The risk to the GPS constellation itself 
would come from a loss of access to that orbital region if lower altitudes experienced 
significant collision events. If the LEO regions of space cannot be safely traversed, the 
federal government will be unable to replace ageing GPS satellites and the ability to 
maintain full capabilities will be compromised.28 
While the body of literature regarding space debris is growing and generally agrees 
it is a threat, literature on the efficacy of international agreements and treaties regarding 
space debris agree that these agreements are outdated and in need of revision. The most 
significant document with regard to debris ownership is the United Nation’s Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967, which establishes that ownership of any object placed in space is retained 
by the owning state, regardless of the condition of the object, even after it returns to 
Earth.29 The Outer Space Treaty also establishes that the owning state is liable for any 
damages an object may cause to another object or territory.30 An attempt to clarify 
ownership and liability is found in the Registration Convention of 1976 and the Liability 
Convention of 1972, but a growing body of literature identifies that these treaties and 
conventions have not kept pace with the evolving space sector, specifically the growing 
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commercial space market.31 While this scholarship suggests that updates need to be made 
to these documents, the United Nations currently has no plan to do so. Any future 
remediation efforts will have to navigate these treaties and conventions. 
While conducting research on recent successful projects at NASA, partnerships 
with the private sector were found to be a driver of success in these programs. This 
discovery led to research on the efficacy of a public–private framework in solving complex 
issues. This research was conducted to establish whether NASA’s success was an outlier 
or if it aligned with the existing literature on this management framework. During the 
literature review of public–private partnerships, several benefits of this approach were 
identified. Generally, the literature shows that public–private partnerships must leverage 
the strengths of both sides to be successful. In examining the history of these arrangements, 
Bovaird highlights three strengths of such partnerships: economies of scale, economies of 
scope, and opportunities of mutual learning.32 Bovaird asserts that these three strengths 
can make a partnership between the private and public sectors stronger in a particular 
endeavor than if pursued individually.33 Challenges to these partnerships include the fear 
of losing employment due to restructuring, the loss of control from a management 
perspective for both sides, and the fear that profits will come ahead of the public good.34 
Research by Busch and Givens highlights similar strengths and weaknesses discussed by 
Bovaird in an analysis of public–private partnerships in homeland security.35 The scholars 
find that the government benefits from partnering with private-sector contractors in areas, 
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such as hiring, technological innovation, resource utilization, and the use of specialists to 
fulfill specific needs.36 Specific challenges to these relationships include differing 
management styles between public and private organizations, legal and ethical challenges, 
and transparency issues.37 These challenges mirror some of the challenges that Bovaird 
highlighted. 
A unique feature of public–private partnerships is that each party brings different 
strengths and experiences into the arrangement that can be built upon for future efforts in 
shared learning. Several scholars confirm the role of shared learning in successful 
partnerships. Research by Poland examined partnerships between police departments and 
their surrounding communities to improve trust in law enforcement and reduce crime.38 
The literature highlights three factors contributing to successful partnerships: the ability to 
learn from the other party, displaying flexibility, and creating a plan toward a common 
goal.39 Berry et al. also highlighted several of the successful factors identified by Poland 
in their research of effective community-law enforcement partnerships. The scholars have 
found that such factors as strong leadership, effective communication, proximity of 
operations, and consistent sharing of data between the parties lead to successful 
partnerships.40 
One aspect of the public–private partnership NASA implemented was the resulting 
effort would not have been possible if either side had acted independently. I looked for 
literature providing examples of partnerships that achieved results that exceeded what 
either party could have realized independently. Research by Lucas highlights such a 
situation in the World Health Organization’s partnership with private pharmaceutical 
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companies for research and training in tropical diseases.41 This research demonstrates that 
significant technical and organizational challenges can be overcome when public–private 
partnerships take advantage of the strengths of the parties involved.42 This partnership 
overcame the lack of financial incentives on the part of private-sector drug companies and 
the lack of technical knowledge on the part of the World Health Organization.43 By 
leveraging the strength of each organization involved, the resulting program successfully 
accomplished a goal that neither could have independently, that of combatting tropical 
disease. This conclusion is another common theme in the literature; the private sector often 
has the technical capability to solve complex problems or pursue innovative technology, 
yet it will not pursue a program it deems unprofitable.  
Another body of work has found that public–private partnerships can reduce 
government spending to an extent. Research by Pearlman and Scerbo demonstrates the 
ability of local governments to reduce energy costs by partnering with private enterprise.44 
They highlight a specific example in which one community reduced energy usage through 
a partnership with a private renewable energy firm through tax credits, competitive 
bidding, and fixed-rate billing.45 In examining this example, Pearlman and Scerbo 
demonstrate that a competitive bidding process and tax credits are a way to reduce 
government spending by partnering with the private sector. Additional benefits can be 
found at higher levels of governments as well. San Miguel and Summers, on the other hand, 
demonstrate that leveraging improved private sector strengths at higher levels of 
government comes at a higher financial cost. In their research regarding public–private 
partnerships in defense acquisitions in the United Kingdom, San Miguel and Summers 
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examined the use of privately financed initiatives as opposed to strictly government-
financed procurement.46 A significant drawback to this approach was the increased cost 
over publicly funded programs.47 Private-sector financing was found to be more 
expensive. However, by having the private partner acquire the financing, the risk of failure 
is transferred from the public purchaser to the private developer.48 The military loses no 
financial capital if the manufacturer cannot fulfill the contract. San Miguel and Summers 
found that this process reduced schedule delays and cost overruns and recommended it be 
used by the U.S. Department of Defense.49  
In a similar case study analyzing the use of privately financed initiatives in defense 
procurement, Jankowski, McGee, and Lehmann found the same benefit to the government 
agency in terms of protections.50 This type of partnership defers the risk of failed deadlines 
or unmet contractual requirements to the contractor, which provides the government buyer 
some protection from delays and cost overruns.51 Conversely, this style of contract also 
protects the manufacturer against design changes from the purchasing agency. After a 
contract has been signed, the purchaser will pay for any changes made to the schedule or 
product.52 These examples in defense procurement demonstrate that properly structured 
partnerships between the public and private sectors protect both parties and improve 
efficiency in terms of delivering hardware on time and on budget. 
This unique environment presents a distinct challenge when debris in orbit remains 
in place for decades or longer. Decades of neglect have resulted in an orbital environment 
in which the removal of existing debris is necessary to prevent future collisions that place 
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U.S. satellites at risk. A lack of research and development into technologies specific to 
debris removal is a challenge to implementing any remediation program, due in part to 
national policies recommending other means to mitigate the risk of debris. Furthermore. 
the challenges in debris ownership and liability as defined in existing international 
agreements all present obstacles in implementing a remediation program.  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Neglect on the part of all space-faring nations has resulted in an orbital environment 
with a growing population of uncontrolled debris. The impact speeds of collisions with 
orbital debris result in significant to catastrophic damage both to the debris and the 
impacted objected. Due to the physics involved, debris in the higher regions of LEO and 
above will stay in orbit for decades or longer. As the launch rate of satellites into orbit 
increases, the population of orbital debris has grown at a much higher rate.53 The debris, 
however, is not naturally decaying in altitude as quickly as it is being generated. This 
situation has resulted in the debris population reaching a critical mass in the higher altitudes 
of LEO; removal of several objects is now necessary to reduce the risk of future 
catastrophic collisions.54 Given the high altitudes and mass of the objects involved in these 
potential collisions, the effects of the collision will be long lasting.55 This influx of new 
debris into the orbital region increases the risk of future collisions, possibly setting off a 
“Kessler Syndrome” event that can result in the damage and destruction of many 
operational satellites, a loss of their capabilities, and limited access to affected orbits.56 
The United States has been slow to act regarding debris remediation due to policy 
decisions. The United States was the first to generate a list of best practices to reduce 
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debris-generating events known as mitigation standard practices.57 However, these 
practices were not mandated and were therefore unenforceable. Complying with these 
standards may have resulted in a financial burden to satellite operators who may need to 
carry extra fuel to deorbit their satellite upon its end-of-life. Other nations and the United 
Nations eventually adopted mitigation practices as well, but these were also unenforceable 
suggestions.58 The lack of compliance to these practices has contributed significantly to 
the current state of the debris population. The United States is aware the debris population 
is growing, and mitigation alone is insufficient, yet no policy action has been taken to 
enforce mitigation standards or remove debris. The current orbital environment is at risk 
of experiencing one or more catastrophic collision events due to government inaction. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify a process that will allow the United States 
to begin debris remediation missions. This process will need to overcome the identified 
barriers and challenges that have prevented these actions from being taken in the past. I 
employ comparative analysis methods while reviewing the relevant literature related to the 
increase in space debris to determine the threat debris poses to operational satellites. This 
analysis includes literature from public space agencies, academia, and private researchers. 
This analysis concludes that remediation is now necessary to reduce the risk of future 
collision events. A contextual analysis on domestic policies and international treaties is 
used to determine what actions have been taken to address the threat of space debris.  
To determine which organization or company is best suited to lead a remediation 
effort involves exploring the literature regarding domestic space operations using a 
comparative analysis method. These programs are reviewed to ascertain whether the 
desired technical outcome can be achieved, can stay within the allotted budget, and how 
close they can maintain their established schedule. The selection of these metrics is 
intended to look for commonalities in these programs that can be reproduced within a 
remediation program. This analysis reveals the public–private partnerships between NASA 
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and the commercial sector has produced reduced development and operational costs and 
lower risk to schedule delays. Upon making this observation, the literature review is 
expanded to include case studies of the use of public–private partnerships in other sectors 
to determine the efficacy of the program model. 
The output of the thesis is policy recommendations to allow for the development of 
a domestic remediation program. These recommendations are tailored to overcome the 
barriers that have prevented previous actions from being taken, including domestic and 
international policy actions. This thesis also provides recommendations to the program 
structure based on the identified strengths of both the public and private sector, and how 
these strengths can be leveraged within a public–private partnership framework. 
E. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter II of this thesis illustrates the barriers that have prevented any remediation 
efforts from being established within the United States. These challenges come from both 
policy and management actions that result in an environment in which neither the public 
nor the private sector can effectively develop a remediation program independently. 
Chapter III provides evidence that the recent growth in competition and innovation in the 
commercial space industry has resulted in a much more capable sector. This chapter also 
provides evidence that the partnership between NASA and the commercial space industry 
in the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program produced results that 
neither sector was capable of achieving independently that also resulted in the further 
growth of the commercial sector as a whole. 
Chapter IV discusses the state of the art regarding debris remediation technologies, 
both domestically and internationally. These early efforts provide a foundational 
knowledge base that the United States can build upon while leveraging the power of the 
public–private partnership model established during COTS. This chapter also illustrates 
the policy actions from both NASA and the federal government as a whole that are needed 
to begin such a program. 
Chapter V provides a framework to build a domestic remediation capability using 
the public–private partnership model NASA has successfully leveraged for almost 15 
15 
years. This chapter also identifies the specific policy decisions that need to happen to bring 
about the start of a remediation program. Lastly, this chapter discusses the potential for 
future cooperation between the United States and other nations and proposes actions that 
may bring about new international agreements that will allow for a direct path for the large-
scale remediation efforts needed to minimize the threat from debris. 
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II. CHALLENGES TO DEBRIS REMOVAL 
This chapter identifies specific challenges that have prevented the United States 
from developing a remediation program. These issues are domestic and international in 
nature. They relate to both policy decisions and management practices that created an 
environment in which neither public space agencies nor the commercial sector could 
effectively pursue remediation. Any future remediation program will have to address these 
challenges before beginning operations. 
A. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 
The United Nations Outer Space Treaty has two specific articles and related 
conventions that pose a challenge for debris remediation efforts. Article VIII of the treaty 
specifies that the registered owner of the object retains ownership, regardless of the status 
of that object, and the object returning to Earth does not affect this ownership.59 The article 
also states that fragments of an object are still the property of the registered owner.60 The 
1974 Registration Convention added the launching state could be considered the owner of 
payloads launched into space. In situations in which the owner of the spacecraft and the 
launching state are not the same, the two entities will determine between the two which 
one is the registered owner.61 Whether the object is functional, intact, or in several pieces, 
has no bearing on ownership. This article makes it illegal for any party other than the 
owning state to manipulate an object in space; at least without clear permission from the 
owning state.62 Article VIII pertains to future remediation missions in that any state 
owning a spacecraft performing removal missions would be in violation of the Outer Space 
Treaty if it manipulated any object owned by another state. Due to sensitive technologies 
and national security concerns involving many satellites in orbit, states are hesitant to allow 
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other states access to their assets in orbit, which makes permission to remediate these 
objects by another state unlikely.63 
To avoid any violations of the Outer Space Treaty, the United States should begin 
by only remediating U.S.-owned debris objects. No new convention has occurred at the 
United Nations to address the debris problem, and even strong proponents of the United 
Nations have doubts in its ability to create any updated international treaties with regard to 
space debris and ownership.64 This lack of progress in addressing debris ownership 
through international agreements presents a challenge to any U.S. remediation effort. Any 
U.S. spacecraft that comes in contact without permission with a foreign-owned debris 
object would be in breach of the Outer Space Treaty. By focusing on remediating U.S. 
debris only, the United States can avoid any potential international incidents. Furthermore. 
in the case of a collision, the literature demonstrates that many U.S.-owned debris objects 
in the orbits are identified as causing significant disruption.65 
Focusing on remediating only U.S.-owned objects will also allow the program to 
narrow its attention to bring these capabilities to maturity. This focus can also lay a 
foundation upon which future large-scale remediation efforts can be built. The participating 
commercial partners will be well-positioned to lead in commercial remediation services 
upon demonstrating a viable remediation capability. Additionally, as reliability improves 
and the technology matures, the United States can explore international cooperation. A 
domestic-only approach can improve remediation systems and techniques to build 
confidence into the systems from potential international partners or customers. 
B. NO FOCUS ON DEBRIS REMOVAL 
The lackadaisical approach taken by all space-faring nations to debris generating 
activities has resulted in the growth of the space debris population. The creation of 
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mitigation guidelines by the United States and other nations is one method to control the 
growth in the debris population. These mitigation guidelines are an established set of 
practices, that when followed, should prevent the creation of more debris. Given that 
research by the European Space Agency (ESA) shows international intentional compliance 
with the standards is poor since less than half of the payloads launched in the last decade 
reside in an orbit that complies with mitigation guidelines, the efficacy of mitigation 
guideline at this point is questionable.66 For the payloads that require a maneuver to move 
to a compliant altitude, only 30 percent perform maneuvers to comply with an approximate 
20 percent success rate.67  
The United States led in developing debris mitigation practices to limit debris-
generating events, with NASA being the first agency to establish such practices. The 
agency’s initial effort occurred in 1993 with NASA Management Instruction 1700.8, which 
directed mission planners to limit the risks of their programs generating debris or causing 
collisions.68 Examples of recommend actions from this document include the depletion of 
on-board energy storage devices after a spacecraft’s end-of-life to limit the risk of 
explosion and limited orbital lifetimes to 25 years after end of mission.69 Two years later, 
NASA published a safety standard document providing guidance on how to comply with 
1700.8 in the areas of normal operation, explosions and break-ups, collisions, post-mission 
disposal, and atmospheric reentry.70 In 2001, the Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices (ODMSP) was created to limit debris generation across all U.S. government 
agencies.71 
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The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) established the 
first set of internationally accepted mitigation guidelines in 2002.72 The IADC is the 
internationally recognized authority on space debris.73 The United States followed suit in 
developing mitigation guidelines for all domestic space launches in 2007.74 Research 
conducted by J.-C. Liou, Chief Scientist for Orbital Debris at NASA, shows that NASA’s 
mitigation practices, followed by other U.S. agencies, are, “more quantitative and strict 
than the IADC and the UN SD mitigation guidelines.”75 However, even though the United 
States has been a leader in creating mitigation practices, it trails only Russia in owning the 
highest amount of debris in dangerous orbits.76  
While the United States should be commended for attempting to slow future debris 
growth through mitigation practices, national space policies have lacked clear direction to 
take any action to remove debris from orbit. A review of the literature in the field found 
that several experts believe remediation is now necessary to protect satellites in crowded 
orbits and avoid disastrous collision events.77 No U.S. policy has mandated a remediation 
effort in response to the threat of debris. While several national space policies mentioned 
space debris and encouraged behaviors to limit its growth and encourage other states to do 
so as well, the U.S. government directed no further action outside of compliance to 
mitigation practices until 2018. 
The Trump Administration was the first to call for action beyond international 
cooperation and adherence to mitigation practices, and specifically called for remediation 
efforts. The White House released Space Policy Directive-3 (SPD-3) in 2018 that directed 
several government agencies to act to protect U.S. assets in space. This policy called on 
the United States to make improvements in Space Traffic Management (STM), Space 
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Situational Awareness (SSA), and encouraged growth in the commercial sector to protect 
the nation’s space-based capabilities.78 This policy directive resulted in a 2019 update to 
NASA’s ODMSP, which provided encouragement, but not a mandate, to remove satellites 
from orbit immediately following the end of its mission as opposed to a 25-year window.79 
The new guidelines also suggested post-mission-disposal systems have a demonstrated 90-
percent reliability.80 SPD-3 acknowledged that mitigation practices alone have been 
unable to keep pace with the rapid growth in global space operations and called for the 
pursuit of remediation efforts in conjunction with regular updates to mitigation practices.81 
SPD-3 does not put a compliance mechanism in place with regard to mitigation practices. 
Not all satellite operators followed past less-restrictive mitigation practices to the letter. 
Thus, it is illogical to assume that the more-restrictive ODMSP established by SPD-3 will 
result in a higher compliance rate. 
NASA, nor any other federal agency, have responded to the call to pursue 
remediation efforts. The recommendation to begin this work means acknowledging the 
threat debris poses to critical space-based infrastructure at the highest levels of government. 
SPD-3 fell short of mandating action; it is still just a suggestion on the part of the 
government. The literature shows that not only is remediation necessary to prevent future 
collisions, it also shows that satellite operators have not been complying with agreed upon 
mitigation practices. Any policy action that does not address either of these challenges is 
no more likely to succeed than any preceding policy. U.S. satellites are put at risk and the 
nation’s security and economic prosperity jeopardized by a lack of clear direction and 
mandated mitigation practices. The scientific community and experts within NASA 
acknowledge that remediation efforts are needed in conjunction with strict adherence to 
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mitigation standards. The White House also acknowledged this need, yet the United States 
still has not made any progress in this field. 
C. INEFFICIENT PROJECT MANAGEMENT AT NASA 
Any future efforts by NASA will have to overcome the challenges the agency has 
faced from a program management standpoint. While many acknowledge the technical 
achievement of programs, such as Apollo, the space shuttle, and the ISS, NASA has often 
faced schedule delays and cost overruns related to its efforts. Many of these challenges 
have occurred across a wide range of programs, which highlights a cultural weakness 
within the agency.82 These challenges have plagued both manned and unmanned missions. 
Any attempted remediation efforts would have to overcome this obstacle. 
The operational structure of the space shuttle program is an early example of 
NASA’s inefficient management. Research by Bromberg shows that in 1991 alone, NASA 
spent $4.3 billion on its fleet of orbiters; this figure was nearly one-third of the agency’s 
budget.83 While some upgrades were performed to the fleet at that time, much of that cost 
went to maintenance on the shuttles themselves. After being advised by the Clinton 
Administration in 1995 that its budget would be reduced by $5 billion over the next five 
years, the Agency knew the current model of shuttle operations was not sustainable.84 The 
management structure handling space shuttle operations oversaw 86 separate contracts 
with 56 different vendors.85 This management structure caused gross inefficiency, 
increased program costs, and required significant management staffing. The management 
team needed to oversee shuttle operations stood at 3,000 people at this time.86 Inefficiency 
 
82 Paul K. Martin, NASA Cost and Schedule Overruns: Acquisitions and Program Management 
Challenges (Washington, DC: NASA Office of Inspector General, 2018), 1, https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/CT-
18-002.pdf. 
83 Joan Lisa Bromberg, NASA and the Space Industry (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999), loc. 2469 of 3428, Kindle.  
84 Bromberg, loc. 2476. 
85 Carl E. Behrens, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and 
Satellite Exports, CRS Order Code IB93062 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 
CRS-4, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a456523.pdf. 
86 Bromberg, NASA and the Space Industry, loc. 2476. 
23 
in managing the shuttle caused ripple effects across the agency. Less funding was available 
for other programs since so much of the annual budget was used to keep the shuttle program 
operational.87 
Testimony from NASA Inspector General Paul K. Martin to the House 
Subcommittee on Science, Space, and Technology in 2018 identified an overly optimistic 
mindset within NASA to contributing to these delays and cost overruns.88 Martin identifies 
a culture within the agency that identifies program success based on technical 
accomplishment, with schedules and cost often overlooked in the pursuit of this goal.89 
This culture created a management environment that often generated unrealistic cost and 
schedule projections that led to the presumption that if budget shortfalls occurred, the 
Agency or Congress would provide more funding.90 Martin uses the term “Hubble 
psychology” to explain this management style. He explains that it is an “an expectation 
among Agency personnel that projects that fail to meet initial cost and schedule goals will 
receive additional funding and subsequent scientific and technological success will 
overshadow budgetary and schedule problems.”91 The Hubble Telescope, the poster-child 
for this philosophy, also experienced delays and overruns. Martin warns moreover that this 
same philosophy of being “too big to fail” can also be applied to current programs, such as 
the James Webb Space Telescope, the Orion crew capsule, and the Space Launch 
System.92 According to Martin, the moon landing, the recovery of the Apollo 13 
astronauts, and the on-orbit repair of the Hubble Space Telescope have benefitted from this 
optimistic approach to program management that also resulted in significant technical 
achievements.93 However, Martin highlights that when cost overruns occur on large 
projects, other programs and missions within the agency suffer due to the shifting of 
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funding away from smaller projects to keep large ones solvent.94 While this method may 
keep the large programs moving, it negatively impacts the rest of the agency and may lead 
Congress to have less confidence in NASA to deliver projects on time and on budget. 
The cancellation of a large program, the Constellation, a NASA program intended 
to return astronauts both to LEO, as well as the moon following the retirement of the space 
shuttle, is another specific example of poor management. The program began in 2005 under 
the Bush Administration, but President Obama cancelled the project in 2010 due to 
program management challenges.95 Contrary to the programs highlighted earlier by 
Martin, Constellation’s challenges were deemed too big to overcome. A 2011 report by 
NASA highlighted some of the lessons learned from the challenges of the Constellation 
program, and several relate to inefficient management.96 
NASA recognized that too much oversight was being placed on contractors 
building the spacecraft, and example being the Orion crew capsule. Significant manpower, 
which results in a fixed cost to the program budget, was devoted to ensuring that contractors 
performed certain construction tasks, such as soldering or wiring procedures, to specific 
NASA standards.97 When the program was cancelled, a review found that these processes 
brought questionable value to the program. The manufacturing processes of large 
aerospace contractors were found to be sufficient and did not require this level of 
oversight.98 Additionally, according to NASA, adherence to the original design 
specifications throughout the construction of the Orion crew capsule resulted in a vehicle 
that was “overly constrained, too heavy, and had performance challenges.”99 The 
spacecraft began to improve only after being allowed to deviate from the original design 
specifications. After reviewing the design and specifying only the systems needed for 
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mission success and crew sustainability, no additional specifications were necessary to 
reduce the risk to spacecraft or crew.100 The Constellation review report recommended a 
similar approach of streamlining design specifications for future spacecraft construction 
programs.101 
The efforts to develop and construct the elements of the Constellation program were 
divided among several NASA centers to provide work and funding to as much of the NASA 
workforce as possible.102 While well intentioned, this decision led to poor communication 
and confusion concerning the roles and responsibilities of the different facilities.103 Upon 
review of the program, this diversification may have benefitted the different centers, but 
did not benefit the program as a whole.104 As the program evolved, necessary changes 
were not identified by all the various centers working on the project, which then led to the 
program’s lack of cohesion and efficiency.105 This inefficiency, along with the other 
management challenges identified in the Constellation report, created an environment in 
which adherence to schedules and budgets was not possible. NASA indeed fell victim to 
the overly optimistic mindset identified by NASA Inspector General Paul Martin. 
If NASA is to be involved in the development or operation of a debris remediation 
program, the lessons learned from the Constellation program need to be incorporated into 
program management to avoid a similar fate. NASA has a track record of significant 
technical achievement. The lunar landings and the space shuttle program are prime 
examples of these accomplishments. However, these programs were deemed a national 
imperative that resulted in a culture in which technical progress was to be achieved 
regardless of the costs involved. The evidence shows that this mindset has penetrated many 
large programs in NASA; inefficient management practices are commonplace. While many 
programs survive being over budget and behind schedule, the Constellation program was 
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cancelled due management deficiencies and the resultant delays and overruns. 
Additionally, cost overruns can damage other NASA programs due to the re-prioritizing of 
funding to keep large programs on track.106 Management styles need to evolve if NASA 
is to create an environment that enables both technical achievement and on-budget 
performance for remediation efforts. 
D. STAGNANT COMMERCIAL SPACE SECTOR 
NASA and the U.S. Air Force’s actions led to an environment in which the U.S. 
commercial space sector relied on government business to sustain itself. Significant 
oversight and adherence to government manufacturing standards crippled the industry’s 
ability to innovate. In addition, the lack of a significant customer base outside of 
government launches provided little incentive to deviate from these practices. The 
commercial industry was incapable of large initiatives outside of government projects due 
to this relationship between the public and private sectors. Debris remediation efforts were 
also not possible unless a government agency contracted with the commercial sector to do 
so. 
Beginning the in the 1960s and progressing through the 1980s, the United States’ 
policies related to space exploration led to a stagnant commercial space sector. This period 
saw significant technical achievements, such as the Apollo and space shuttle programs, but 
NASA developed these efforts while contractors were used to construct hardware but with 
significant oversight and retained no ownership of the designs to generate additional 
revenue.107 In the late 1980s, the commercial launch sector began placing payloads into 
orbit. However, NASA and the Air Force’s decisions resulted in a marketplace dominated 
by large defense contractors and restricted by ineffective national policies. This limited 
market resulted in a commercial space sector reliant on government payloads to sustain 
itself and was incapable of innovation and efficiency, both key factors to successful large-
scale space programs. 
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The 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act was an early effort to grow the 
commercial space industry. This act specifies that commercial launch capability is 
complementary to government launching services. A capable commercial space sector 
allows the United States to stay competitive internationally, while providing economic and 
national security benefits.108 The timing of this legislation was not beneficial to any 
potential commercial launch operators, NASA was offering launch services for payloads 
below-cost on the space shuttle.109 Congress passed legislation to grow the commercial 
sector, but NASA undercut their efforts to draw customers to the then-new space shuttle. 
Fears of schedule delays in using the shuttle caused several commercial launch customers 
to overseas launch companies, which resulted in a loss of launch revenues and challenges 
to bring these sales back domestically.110  
Following the accidental loss of the space shuttle Challenger in January 1986, the 
Reagan Administration directed NASA to cease launching commercial payloads on any 
future shuttle missions.111 This tragedy created an opportunity for the commercial launch 
sector. By eliminating the largest domestic competitor to launching commercial payloads, 
the burgeoning commercial launch sector should have had a path toward growth and 
solvency. Instead, the federal government’s practices continued to hamper progress in the 
following years. 
Federal agencies elected to procure boosters from commercial builders to launch 
government payloads; they were buying the whole rocket instead of purchasing a launch 
service.112 The Air Force believed this method would allow for commercial sector growth. 
Manufacturers  were required to build all launch vehicles to the stringent standards required 
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by military.113 The intent of this requirement was to lower the unit cost for military-
procured boosters that would then create redundancy by having commercial boosters 
available to launch government payloads if needed.114 The Air Force was dictating to 
commercial rocket manufacturers how they should build rockets for non-Air Force 
launches. By limiting commercial space companies into manufacturing only government-
approved hardware, technological progress in the industry was slow. Given that the federal 
government was the customer for 90 percent of all space hardware and service purchases, 
the commercial sector was unable to innovate.115 
By procuring the boosters in this way, government operators imposed a significant 
administrative burden on contractors and oversight on the construction of these systems.116 
These efforts were intended as a quality control measure and historically achieved good 
results in terms of safe launches; however, these results came at a high cost.117 Building 
components to the specified standard results in higher manufacturing costs, and the 
required oversight by the government purchaser brings significant personnel costs for 
reviewing officials.118 As suggested by Bromberg, the Air Force and NASA kept using 
this style of procurement to protect those budgets and management oversight jobs.119 This 
process also limited the commercial builder’s ability to innovate; any changes to a 
component or design would be subject to review and inspection, which caused delays of 
up to two years.120 
The government further frustrated commercial launch companies by limiting access 
to its launch facilities. These companies did not possess their own launch facilities but 
relied on access to federal facilities to launch their rockets. As the commercial space 
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industry was attempting to grow in the 1980s, commercial launches faced unpredictable 
launch schedules at federal launching facilities; government launches were given priority 
in scheduling.121 Berkowitz highlights how this unpredictability posed a challenge to the 
U.S. commercial space sector in providing reliable launch services to clients. Commercial 
launch providers were limited to flying when the government had an available window; 
government launches could also bump commercial launches off the schedule.122 It was 
difficult to provide firm launch dates to customers compared to commercial launch 
providers overseas.123 
Following the release of a new Commercial Space Initiative in 1988 by the Reagan 
Administration, NASA changed its philosophy from procuring boosters themselves and 
began pursuing the procurement of launch services from the commercial launch 
industry.124 However, NASA and the Air Force’s decisions stacked the deck in favor of 
large defense contractors in the young commercial launch market. Despite the regulation-
heavy environment in which the commercial booster industry was operating, by spring 
1988, three major defense contractors were now manufacturing boosters for the U.S. Air 
Force: McDonnel Douglas, Martin Marietta, and General Dynamics.125 NASA, in an effort 
to rebuild domestic launch capability quickly following the events of the Challenger 
accident, chose to work directly with the boosters’ manufacturers to procure launch 
services in lieu of contracting launches to third-party enterprises.126 
In 1989, the commercial launch industry took flight when the Department of 
Transportation’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation licensed its first launch.127 
The groundwork laid by the Air Force and NASA put the three large defense contractors 
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in a prime position to dominate the new marketplace. Between 1989 and 2003, these 
contractors had launched 107 of the 154 commercial payloads.128 Even less competition 
occurred in the government’s national security launches. Boosters of the Titan (Martin 
Marietta, later Lockheed Martin), Atlas (Martin Marietta, later Lockheed Martin), and 
Delta (then Lockheed Martin, now Boeing) families were placing government payloads 
into orbit.129 The exception was the aircraft-launched Pegasus booster, manufactured by 
Orbital Sciences, which was used for smaller launches.130 
In 1994, the Air Force began a program to develop a new generation of boosters to 
orbit national security payloads.131 This program resulted in the Air Force paying for the 
creation of the Lockheed Martin Atlas V and the Boeing Delta IV boosters.132 Both these 
boosters are based on the previous generation of Atlas and Delta boosters, which date back 
to the 1960s. Lockheed Martin and Boeing joined forces in booster development in 2005 
and created United Launch Alliance (ULA). This new company manufactured the Delta 
and Atlas boosters and provided launching services for the government. ULA maintained 
a monopoly on national security launches until 2015.133 
In the roughly 30-year stretch from the loss of the Challenger to 2003, the 
commercial launch industry established itself by launching for both commercial and 
government customers. However, the restrictions imposed by solely backing the large 
defense contractors in the latter half of the 1980s, erratic scheduling tempo due to priority 
being place on national security launches, and a lack of competition and therefore 
innovation, resulted in an industry that saw little progress. Smaller companies, such as Sea 
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Launch, Orbital ATK, and Astrotech, were not drawing as much business as the larger 
defense contractors.134  
E. CONCLUSION 
The current amount of debris in orbit is the result of space-faring nations neglecting 
their responsibilities to protect the orbital environment in limiting debris-generating 
activities. The United States created mitigation guidelines to prevent debris-generating 
activities, but these efforts have fallen short of their intended purpose due to a lack of 
compliance on the part of satellite operators. National space policies and international 
mitigation guidelines have failed to curb the growth in the debris population. Furthermore. 
they have failed in calling for remediation efforts to remove dangerous debris objects 
currently in orbit.  
A domestic program to remediate space debris must overcome several barriers to 
succeed. These barriers are formed from outdated international treaties that have failed to 
keep pace with the growth of the global space industry, along with policy decisions and 
management practices that have hindered the nation’s space programs. Management 
challenges have been overcome with brute force efforts; examples include the Apollo 
spacecraft and the space shuttle. These programs were deemed national imperatives with 
significant national security considerations. This management model is unsustainable 
given the high costs associated with such programs.  
The resulting damage from a prolonged disruption of satellite capabilities are just 
as grave a concern as the Soviets posed during the Cold War. Taking the steps to overcome 
these challenges to secure U.S. assets in space is imperative to homeland security. These 
challenges are not the technical mountains that NASA summited developing the Apollo 
spacecraft or the space shuttle but are a matter of sound policy and management decisions 
that may be solved through a partnership with the commercial space industry. The solutions 
to these challenges are within U.S. capabilities; it simply must decide to act. 
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III. STRENGTHS OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
The previous chapter illustrated some of the challenges a domestic remediation 
program would have to overcome. This chapter highlights recent progress made in 
domestic space operations. A growth in innovation, efficiency, and competition has 
resulted in a diverse and robust commercial space sector. The arrival of companies with 
new business philosophies, and successful partnerships between NASA and the 
commercial sector, has led to the evolution of the commercial space sector. While both 
sectors have been reliant on one another since space operations began, the new framework 
of partnership is leveraging the strengths of both sectors and proving beneficial to both 
sides. This evidence demonstrates the potential of a synergistic relationship between 
NASA and the commercial space sector; together they can accomplish more than acting 
separately. 
A. COMMERCIAL SECTOR COMPETITION AND GROWTH 
The previous chapter illustrated how large aerospace contractors dominated the 
commercial launch sector, and effectively formed a monopoly on national security 
launches and lofting most of the commercial payloads as well. The commercial launch 
market began to change once SpaceX entered the marketplace in 2006.135 SpaceX utilized 
several methods to reduce costs, improve efficiency, and increase performance in pursuit 
of gaining customers and building toward their larger exploration goal, the colonization of 
Mars.136 Lean business practices, in-house manufacturing, and reusability were 
innovations that SpaceX brought to the commercial launch sector, and in doing so, sent 
ripples across the industry and forced its competition to adapt. These pursuits ultimately 
ended ULA’s monopoly on national security launches and created a competitive 
marketplace for both commercial and government launches. 
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To reduce costs, SpaceX pursued reusability for its Falcon 9 booster. The rationale 
for reusability was to recoup as much of the manufacturing cost as possible of the booster 
to provide savings for future launches; customers would not have to pay for the 
manufacture of a new booster with every launch. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk equates 
disposing of a rocket booster after one use to purchasing a new commercial airliner for 
each flight.137 This type of business model would bankrupt the airline industry. SpaceX 
changed the commercial launch sector by applying this same logic. To accomplish this 
task, the Falcon 9 first stage booster reenters the atmosphere after depositing its payload in 
orbit, then slows by firing its engine and steers itself using fins to a designated landing 
zone.138 Once the booster is recovered, it can be refurbished and launched again at a cost 
of approximately half of the original manufacture price.139 This approach translates to 
significant cost savings that can then be passed on to launch customers. 
The efforts to increase efficiency and reduce costs resulted in an approximate cost 
of $57 million for the Falcon 9 booster.140 To put that figure in perspective, ULA’s similar 
booster, the Atlas V, cost $184 million when the Falcon 9 entered the market.141 This price 
reflects the different philosophies the companies were using. SpaceX took the approach to 
reduce costs as much as possible that resulted in innovations in reusability and vertical 
integration. ULA had designated reliability above all other factors in its designs, an 
attribute deemed critical by ULA’s primary customer, the U.S. government.142 ULA has 
been successful in its pursuit of reliability; the company conducted its 140th consecutive 
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successful launch in August 2020.143 However, the lack of competition did not put any 
pressure on ULA to reduce costs; it tailored its services to meet the needs of its primary 
customer. Once SpaceX demonstrated Falcon 9 as a viable alternative to the Atlas V, ULA 
reassessed its manufacturing procedures and trimmed its payroll to compete, reducing the 
unit cost of the Atlas V to $109 million.144 
Statistics from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) show that from 2004 to 
October 2020, large aerospace companies (including ULA after its conception in 2005) 
accounted for only 32 of the 209 licensed commercial launches flown.145 Additionally, 
since SpaceX began delivering commercial payloads in 2008, large aerospace companies 
account for only 18 of 173 commercial launches.146 SpaceX, along with other operators, 
such as Rocket Lab, Blue Origin, and Orbital Sciences, have become major players in the 
commercial launch sector, and have effectively ended the monopoly on commercial 
launches held by large aerospace contractors. Reusability is now utilized by Blue Origin 
and Rocket Lab, with ULA pursuing this capability in its new Vulcan booster.147 This 
change in the market is generating competition and driving innovation, resulting in reduced 
costs to customers and enhanced capabilities available for purchase. 
SpaceX was also able to break the monopoly held by ULA for national security 
launches after suing the U.S. Air Force in 2014.148 The basis of the lawsuit was that the 
ULA contracts were uncompetitive and amounted to a federal subsidy to the aerospace 
contractors.149 This argument had merit given that the government was paying additional 
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fees to ULA to maintain its launch infrastructure even when no launches were occurring as 
a matter of national security.150 By allowing competition and multiple companies to launch 
national security payloads, redundancy would be built into the launch capability; the United 
States would still be able to perform launches in the event that one launch provider was 
unavailable. Additionally, SpaceX argued it could provide launch services at a 50-percent 
reduction compared to ULA’s cost estimates.151 The lawsuit was settled in 2014 and 
SpaceX was contracted for national security payloads, conducting its first launch in 
February 2015.152  
The market share of launches for the federal government is showing further 
indications of increased competition. The Pentagon signed contracts for national security 
payloads for launches between 2022 and 2027; ULA was awarded 60 percent of the 
launches, and SpaceX received 40 percent.153 Northrop Grumman and Blue Origin also 
bid on these contracts but were not selected; however, these companies supply solid rocket 
boosters (Northrop Grumman) and the main engines (Blue Origin) for ULA’s Vulcan 
booster.154 Four companies competing for national security launches show significant 
growth in competition since SpaceX sued the Air Force to gain entry into this segment. 
The launch statistics since 2004 clearly demonstrate that the commercial sector has 
increased the diversity of launch providers being utilized for both commercial and 
government payloads. A healthy and competitive marketplace for launch services in the 
United States now exists, and this competition is driving new investment in the sector. 
According to statistic from the Department of Commerce, global investment in space 
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technologies totals $17.5 billion in 2020, with 62 percent of that total being invested in the 
domestic commercial space sector.155 
The arrival of SpaceX and the resulting market competition has resulted in a healthy 
commercial space sector in which several companies are now key players in the market. 
This diversity is vital to any successful ADR program. For a partnership to be successful, 
project management must utilize the strengths of both sectors. The commercial space sector 
is showing strong innovation, along with a reduction in costs and increased efficiency. As 
the number of viable companies enters the marketplace, competition grows. This growth 
creates an environment in which NASA will have several capable partners to choose from 
in any partnership; the days of relying on the legacy aerospace contractors are over. 
Leveraging the growth of the commercial sector and its enhanced capabilities will be a key 
factor in the success of a public–private partnership to remediate space debris. 
B. IMPROVED PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
This section provides evidence illustrating that when NASA reduces management 
oversight of large projects, significant cost savings can occur. A change in program 
management for NASA’s fleet of space shuttles is a prime example of how a reduced 
management footprint can reduce costs. In 1995, the results from an outside review panel 
examining shuttle operations made recommendations to NASA to reduce costs and 
increase program efficiency.156 One of the review panel’s recommendations was to move 
all shuttle program operations under one contractor to reduce operational costs.157 In 1996, 
NASA signed a six-year, $7 billion contract with United Space Alliance to maintain its 
fleet of shuttles. Congressional Research Services reports that this new management 
structure resulted in a $1 billion a year reduction in shuttle operations.158 While this 
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arrangement reduced NASA’s management structure and reduced costs, it does not 
represent the full potential of a partnership between the agency and the commercial sector. 
A public–private partner structure has the ability to overcome the management 
challenges identified by Inspector General Martin and the lessons learned report from the 
Constellation program. The evidence cited to illustrate this strength is found in the 
successful partnership between NASA and the commercial space sector in the COTS 
program. The purpose of COTS was to enable resupply missions for cargo to the ISS 
following the retirement of the space shuttle.159 Additionally, the program was intended 
to stimulate the commercial space sector with public sector investment in developing 
commercial space transportation services that could be used by both private and 
government customers.160 By using a new management and contract structure, the agency 
successfully leveraged the strength of lean business practices found in the private sector 
combined with a reduced management footprint to reduce government spending and 
financial risk.161 The new partnership framework established in COTS resulted in a 
synergistic relationship between the two sectors, where the net result of the partnership was 
a stronger product than could have been developed independently. 
COTS utilized limited government investment and a non-contract approach to 
avoid the management pitfalls in previous NASA efforts.162 For both the Constellation and 
space shuttle programs, the management structure was large due to heavy oversight of the 
contractors involved in the program. This approach resulted in significant personnel costs 
in oversight roles that added significant fixed costs to both program budgets. The COTS 
structure required a much smaller program office and oversight structure due to the unique 
nature of the partnership between the two sectors. NASA sought to share the development 
costs for cargo resupply spacecraft with commercial partners, after which NASA would 
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then purchase resupply services from the commercial partner. In the end, NASA was 
buying resupply missions, not the actual spacecraft.163  
Since NASA was not procuring spacecraft, the agency was able to avoid using FAR 
procurement contracts and the associated oversight and management costs.164 The result 
of this structure allowed for a significantly smaller management footprint than other NASA 
programs; the COTS management office consisted of only 14 personnel.165 This change 
drastically reduced the fixed-cost of program management, which peaked at five percent 
of total program budget.166 With lower management costs, more of the initial $500-million 
dollar program budget could be devoted to developing the spacecraft instead of paying for 
unnecessary oversight. The work of NASA personnel could then be focused at one location, 
instead of being distributed across several NASA centers, which was another identified 
challenge of the Constellation program. The Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, TX, 
is the base center of operations for the ISS. NASA chose this facility as the home of COTS 
given that most of the knowledge and talent needed for the program was there.167 
To allow for design innovation and to leverage the strengths of the commercial 
sector, NASA requested proposals for specific mission capabilities from the commercial 
sector in lieu of requesting specific designs. One of the drawbacks of the Constellation 
program cited in the after-action report was the development of the Orion crew capsule. 
When the Orion was built to NASA design requirements, the resulting spacecraft 
underperformed. This realization resulted in delays and increased costs. For COTS, NASA 
announced a request for proposals from the commercial sector to submit plans to fulfill 
mission requirements, such as pressurized or un-pressurized cargo delivery to the ISS; 
NASA did not dictate the designs of the spacecraft submitted by industry.168 This leeway 
given in system design allowed bidding contractors to tailor their proposals to match the 
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strengths of their capabilities instead of NASA’s design requirements. The purpose of this 
design approach was not only to encourage participation from the private sector but reduce 
development costs as well.169 Proposals would be rated based on the technology proposed, 
the business plan to accomplish program goals, and access to finances to fund development 
costs.170 
NASA incorporated personnel with expertise in venture capital investment into the 
program office to review the submitted proposals from industry effectively to avoid falling 
into the previously identified pitfall of excessive optimism at the expense of program costs 
identified by Inspector General Martin. A strong business plan and sufficient access to 
funding was identified as a critical component of program success. If a partner could not 
provide adequate funding, development could not progress regardless of the technical 
capabilities of the design.171 A balanced review of all the components of the submitted 
proposals was necessary to ensure program success. 
NASA experienced both failure and success related to selecting commercial 
partners based on evaluating the financial strength of potential partners. The initial partners 
selected for COTS were SpaceX and Rocketplane Kistler (RpK). SpaceX’s proposal was 
the first selected based on its technical strengths, impressive plan for development, and 
strong finances.172 RpK’s proposal was well received by NASA due to its impressive 
modular spacecraft system and strong business plan.173 However, RpK did not have the 
finances on hand to finance its end of the development costs; it would rely on outside 
investment to raise the funds.174 Once again, NASA fell victim to viewing technical 
capabilities as the key to mission success. NASA did not place equal weight to the funding 
aspect of the program.  
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RpK’s financial position presented challenges six months into the program. The 
company failed to raise adequate funding by the first program milestone in September 
2006.175 NASA granted extensions and allowed funding to be deferred to later milestone 
dates to allow more time for RpK to raise funds, but RpK was unable to secure the 
necessary capital and NASA terminated the partnership in August 2007.176 NASA learned 
from this lapse in judgement, and during a second round of bidding to find a new partner, 
chose Orbital Sciences.177 The proposal from Orbital Sciences was strong from a technical 
and business standpoint. However, program officials acknowledge that a significant factor 
in their selection was the company had the necessary finances on hand to fully fund 
development.178 
The framework of the partnership and the selection of SpaceX and Orbital Sciences 
resulted in a successful program to develop two resupply systems for the ISS. Total 
development costs for the COTS program were $1.9 billion, with NASA contributing 47 
percent of these costs. SpaceX and Orbital Sciences contributed $454 million and $590 
million, respectively to develop their delivery systems.179 In this co-financed partnership, 
NASA gained access to two independent methods to resupply the ISS while not having to 
develop the program using only public funding. Second, the commercial sector received 
significant investment capital and developed space transport systems that could be used by 
both government and private customers due to the commercial partners retaining ownership 
of the developed systems.180  
By leveraging the lean manufacturing and management practices found in the 
commercial space industry, the resupply spacecraft were developed at a significantly lower 
cost than if NASA had used traditional procurement methods. An example is the 
development costs for SpaceX’s Falcon 9 booster. A 2010 Cost Assessment study 
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estimated the cost of developing the Falcon 9 by NASA using traditional methods to be 
approximately $4 billion dollars.181 The study also found that the SpaceX approach using 
cost-plus Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contracts would cost $1.7 billion.182 Once 
NASA verified the funds actually spent by SpaceX to develop this booster, the total was 
found to be $443 million.183 SpaceX was able to deliver a booster at a cost of 26 percent 
the amount of NASA’s most optimistic estimate.  
With SpaceX retaining ownership of the rocket, additional benefits to both SpaceX 
and the government resulted. As of November 2020, the Falcon 9 has flown 96 times, 88 
of which have been with commercial payloads.184 The COTS partnership led to the 
development of technology that SpaceX and Orbital Sciences can utilize for additional 
revenue streams, an arrangement that allows for long-term benefits for both sides of the 
partnership. Research by Zapata shows that the tax revenue generated from Falcon 9 
launches between 2008 and 2017 exceeds the federal investment in developing the 
booster.185 The example of the Falcon 9 demonstrates that investing public funds into 
private sector space technology provides economic benefits to both sides of the partnership. 
The systems developed in COTS will continue to generate revenue for both sides of the 
partnership for years to come. 
Management teams from both NASA and the commercial partners were kept well 
informed of the progress by establishing a schedule for technology reviews about fixed 
program milestones. Funding would be distributed to the commercial partner upon 
satisfaction of the milestone requirements.186 This process, in conjunction with a smaller 
NASA management team, allowed for clear expectations to be established on both sides of 
the partnership. The identified deficiency of some of the centers being unaware of changes 
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or other challenges when working on the Constellation project was thus alleviated. 
Furthermore. by being able to withhold NASA funding from an underperforming 
commercial partner, RpK, for example, NASA could hold partners accountable for delays 
and overruns or terminate the agreement altogether.187 This framework resulted in more 
accountability for the commercial partners given they were contributing significant 
financing and were not afforded the protection of traditional FAR procurement contracts.  
NASA deemed the COTS partnership a success, so much so that managing 
directives for large programs were changed to encourage program managers to use a similar 
framework when possible.188 NASA is now using similar public–private partnership 
frameworks for the Commercial Crew (CCP) and the Commercial Lunar Payload Services 
(CLPS) programs. CCP is a partnership with SpaceX and Boeing to transport astronauts to 
the ISS. SpaceX has already delivered astronauts to the ISS as part of this program in a 
May 2020 demonstration flight of the Crew Dragon capsule, followed by the first 
operational launch on November 15, 2020.189 The Crew Dragon is an evolution of the 
Dragon cargo capsule developed during COTS, which further illustrates the innovation and 
efficiency found in the commercial sector.190 Like the Falcon 9 booster, Crew Dragon will 
be used outside of NASA missions; the company has announced agreements with Space 
Adventures and Axiom Space to launch passengers into LEO and to the ISS.191 Phil 
McAlister, Director of Commercial Spaceflight for NASA, summarized the implication of 
this arrangement, “this is the kind of outcome envisioned when we initiated CCP: enabling 
a new commercial market in which the U.S. companies provide services; and making 
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NASA ‘one of many customers’.”192 The commercialization of the developed 
technologies provides an environment in which increased launch rates can result in greater 
manufacturing efficiency and safety performance.193 This increased launch tempo would 
not be possible if the systems were limited to NASA missions only.194 
Following in the footsteps of COTS and CCP, CLPS is a program in which NASA 
is acquiring services from the commercial sector, but not the spacecraft themselves, but 
instead for delivery missions to the surface of the moon under the Artemis program. NASA 
Administrator Jim Bridenstine explains, “When we go to the moon, we want to be one 
customer of many customers, in a robust marketplace, between the Earth and the moon.”195 
This model of partnership is intended to foster competition in cost and innovation between 
the participating companies.196 Nine companies were selected in November 2018 for 
eligibility to bid on delivery services to the surface of the moon, with five more companies 
added one year later.197 These companies are bidding on indefinite-delivery/indefinite-
quantity contracts worth a maximum $2.6 billion for combined services running through 
2028.198 The companies selected for these missions are not legacy defense contractors or 
the major commercial players in the private launch industry, but smaller companies that 
NASA hopes will provide fresh perspective and ideas. Chris Cuthbert, Director of CLPS, 
explains, “NASA is committed to working with industry to enable the next round of lunar 
exploration. The companies we have selected represent a diverse community of exciting 
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small American companies, each with their own unique, innovative approach to getting to 
the Moon.”199 
The amount of government money put into developing private sector technologies 
during COTS was significant. Moreover, the processes through which the commercial 
sector was manufactured these systems led to lower costs to the government and 
strengthened the domestic commercial space sector, which resulted in more jobs and tax 
revenue for the nation. Additionally, these achievements could not have been accomplished 
by the commercial sector acting independently. The infusion of public investment into 
SpaceX during COTS and the resulting contracts to resupply the ISS allowed the company 
to pursue improvements to the Falcon 9 and develop the Crew Dragon capsule.200 This 
model has also led NASA to invest in many smaller space companies in the CLPS effort, 
which demonstrates that NASA is trying to develop the commercial sector as whole instead 
of just the major companies. The COTS partnership truly is an example in which the sum 
is greater than the parts of the whole and has created a ground shift in how NASA manages 
programs. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The uncompetitive and stagnant commercial space sector has evolved into an 
innovative and vibrant marketplace. A significant portion of the evidence provided is a 
result of the COTS partnership between the two sectors. While the commercial sector was 
slowly growing before COTS, the infusion of public investment resulted in significant 
growth and increased capabilities of the sector. The structure of the partnership allowed 
technologies to be built in a lean manner, with a focus on innovation instead of NASA 
design specifications. This environment led to breakthroughs in manufacturing and 
technologies, such as reusability. Furthermore. it brought competition to the market that 
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then reduced launch costs for both private and government customers. In a similar fashion 
to the research by Berry et al. on partnerships reviewed for this thesis, COTS was 
successful because of strong leadership, effective communication, proximity of operations, 
and consistent sharing of data between partners.201 All these factors were found to be 
program challenges within NASA’s Constellation program. The proper execution of a 
public–private framework overcame these barriers. 
In a similar manner to Lucas’s research on partnerships to combat tropical disease, 
NASA’s partnership with the commercial sector produced results that neither side of the 
partnership could have attained independently. Lucas highlights how private 
pharmaceutical companies lacked the financial incentive to act and how the World Health 
Organization did not possess the talents to provide research and training to combat these 
diseases.202 Only when the two sides worked together could they create a successful 
program to combat tropical diseases. Resupply services to the ISS presented a similar 
challenge. The commercial sector did not have the financial resources, nor the incentive, 
to develop these capabilities independently. NASA could have acted independently but 
was seeking a more efficient solution to the problem. The private sector provided the 
efficient manufacturing and design processes, while NASA provided access to research 
data and facilities. The result is a program produced at a fraction of the cost if NASA had 
acted independently, which also provided a boost to the commercial space sector in the 
form of public investment. 
The scholarship from San Miguel and Summers, along with Jankowski et al., 
highlights how public–private partnerships have the ability to provide protection to public 
agencies not possible outside of this framework. The ability to terminate agreements with 
underperforming commercial partners provides a protection to public agencies not found 
in traditional procurement efforts.203 The COTS partnership aligns with this research given 
the program’s ability to terminate its agreement with RpK. Instead of facing delays while 
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RpK was procuring outside financing, NASA was able to terminate the agreement and 
move on to another partner quickly to preserve the development schedule and prevent 
wasting further public sector funds on an underperforming partner. In light of the COTS 
program and comparing it to the existing literature on the strengths of public–private 
partnerships, the program’s successes align with the established research. 
The commercial sector has proven to be efficient and innovative, and willing to 
contribute funding for technology development to use these capabilities for commercial 
purposes. These factors provide an environment that NASA can leverage in a partnership 
to begin remediation. The precedent has been set that partnerships are effective; NASA is 
using the method for its two current flagship programs, Commercial Crew and Lunar 
Artemis. NASA could attempt to begin remediation missions using traditional procurement 
methods. Traditional procurement methods appear to be a step backwards in terms of 
progress given the advances that have been made using the public–private partnership 
framework. Furthermore. the threat of space debris needs to be addressed quickly, and the 
efficiency provided in the partnership framework provides an option less likely to face 
schedule delays and cost overruns. By leveraging the vision and innovation of the private 
sector, solutions that NASA may not have envisioned may be presented. The funding and 
access to research facilities that NASA brings, paired with the efficiency and innovation of 
the private sector, provide the highest chance of success for any remediation efforts. 
  
48 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
49 
IV. STATE OF REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGY AND FUTURE 
EFFORTS 
The United States is currently not undertaking any active debris remediation efforts. 
However, the United States has made significant progress in the related field of on-orbit 
servicing (OOS). While not directly intended to remove debris objects from orbit, some of 
the key technologies that will enable a spacecraft to perform OOS missions can be utilized 
for remediation efforts. The successes in this emerging field, mostly due to the performance 
of a commercial spacecraft, provide a foundation of knowledge and experience upon which 
future remediation efforts can build. 
While the United States has taken the lead in developing OOS capabilities, other 
states have begun developing dedicated remediation programs. These efforts are still in the 
early stages of development and are far from being operational. However, these programs 
challenge U.S. leadership in a field that will be relevant to both the public and private 
sectors globally. The threat of debris endangers capabilities ranging from intelligence, 
communication, defense, and infrastructure. As the threat continues to grow due to 
continuous launches, states and private companies that develop a remediation capability 
will have a significant advantage in securing contracts to remove debris. To ensure U.S. 
satellites are protected by U.S. spacecraft, and to secure the economic growth of the 
domestic commercial space sector, a domestic remediation effort must begin. 
A. OVERVIEW OF ACTIVE DEBRIS REMEDIATION 
Active debris remediation (ADR) is the process of physically capturing debris in 
space and removing it from orbit.204 This process is beyond the maneuvers a satellite may 
make at the end of its service life to deorbit and reenter the atmosphere in compliance with 
mitigation protocols.205 ADR missions will require a removal spacecraft to rendezvous 
with debris objects, and then physically move the object to where it either reenters the 
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atmosphere or is moved to a “graveyard” region where it cannot collide with operational 
satellites.206 The literature reviewed for this thesis established that this process is now 
necessary in conjunction with adherence to mitigation practices to prevent significant 
collision events in the future. Furthermore. the literature illustrates the massive debris 
objects found in the orbital altitudes between 775 km and 1,500 km in orbital altitude are 
particularly dangerous.207 The mass of the debris found at these altitudes poses a 
significant risk due to the large amount of fragmentation that the destruction of such a large 
object would produce.208 A collision at these altitudes would pose a risk to satellites in 
these altitudes for many years due to the height of these orbits. The fragments produced in 
any collision could take decades, or even hundreds of years, to deorbit.209 
Currently, no operationally capable technology exists to perform ADR missions of 
any scale. Several technologies are being considered to remediate debris objects, including 
but not limited to, nets, harpoons, drag-augmentation devices, robotic arms, and lasers.210 
The manner in which remediation missions are conducted will vary depending on the 
technology used to remediate the target. Methods, such as using nets, harpoons, or robotic 
arms, to capture debris targets will require remediating spacecraft to rendezvous and 
maneuver in close proximity of targets to capture them. Once these objects are captured, 
the remediating spacecraft can either deorbit them so they reenter the atmosphere or move 
them to an orbit where they no longer present a collision risk to operational satellites.211 
Getting into position to dock with or capture a debris target will require precise 
maneuvering to prevent damage to the remediating spacecraft and the target, an event that 
may generate additional debris. A debris target tumbling in multiple axes will further 
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complicate rendezvous maneuvers; a remediating spacecraft will have to synchronize its 
movements to mirror the target to successfully make contact.212 
Early research on the use of some of these methods of debris capture has begun and 
is discussed later in this chapter. These systems are far from the maturity level needed to 
remediate the massive debris objects residing in the higher altitudes of LEO.213 However, 
breakthroughs have been made, specifically in the United States, in related technologies 
that will be needed for remediation missions. The systems needed to perform rendezvous 
and docking maneuvers have not only been researched domestically, but a U.S. commercial 
space company has reached a level of operational readiness with these systems that has 
opened up a new field of space commerce. 
B. ON-ORBIT SERVICING AND PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
The United States has made significant progress in the field of OOS. While these 
efforts do not pursue the remediation of debris, the work completed within these projects 
can provide a technological springboard for a future public–private partnership in ADR. 
OOS is a developing field in satellite technology with significant implications for debris 
reduction efforts. The Aerospace Corporation defines OOS as, “on-orbit activities 
conducted by a space vehicle that performs up-close inspection of, or results in intentional 
and beneficial changes to, another resident space object (RSO).”214 In more general terms, 
it concerns the repairing or refueling of satellites in orbit to extend their mission lifetimes. 
The space shuttle and astronauts were used in this role from 1984 to the 2009, with the five 
servicing missions to the Hubble Space Telescope being the most visible.215 
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The development of OOS capabilities apply to space debris remediation in two 
significant ways. First, the ability to refuel or repair satellites in orbit will prevent these 
satellites from becoming derelict and contributing to the overall mass of debris. Second, 
many of the capabilities needed to perform OOS parallel the needs of ADR platforms. The 
ability to rendezvous and conduct proximity operations with target objects is a requirement 
of both missions. This section highlights two U.S.-based programs either dedicated or 
related to the OOS mission. These efforts are not committed to the ADR mission, but the 
progress made in these programs can be readily applied to any future remediation program.  
1. SpaceLogistics Mission Extension Vehicle 
The SpaceLogistics (a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman) MEV is marketed as a 
space servicing vehicle; its purpose is to dock with satellites in orbit that have lost the 
ability to maneuver and extend their useful time in orbit.216 This service benefits customers 
by eliminating or delaying the expense of designing and manufacturing a replacement 
spacecraft to fulfill a necessary function. The capabilities needed to perform this mission, 
an example being the ability to rendezvous with derelict objects, is also needed for debris 
remediation missions. These capabilities have passed their development and demonstration 
phase and have achieved operational status, or as determined by NASA to be the highest 
technology readiness level (TRL).217 The early successes of the MEV spacecraft provide 
a foundation for not only the emerging OOS market, but also a launching pad in which 
remediation capabilities can be developed. 
The first spacecraft of this series, MEV-1, was launched on October 9, 2019 and 
rendezvoused with its target, Intelsat’s IS-901, in GEO on February 25, 2020.218 The 
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docking took place 180 miles above the GEO region, where IS-901 had been placed after 
being taken out of service in anticipation of this mission.219 This meeting also represented 
the first time two commercial spacecraft docked in space.220 According to a press release 
from SpaceLogistics parent company, Northrop Grumman, MEV-1 will provide station-
keeping services for IS-901 for five years and then place it in a decommissioning orbit.221 
MEV-1 will then move on to another client satellite to provide additional station-keeping 
services for at least 10 additional years.222  
SpaceLogistics has continued the momentum of MEV-1 with the successful launch 
of MEV-2 in August 2020.223 The client satellite for MEV-2 is another Intelsat satellite in 
GEO, IS-1002.224 Due to the successful rendezvous and docking of MEV-1 with IS-901, 
MEV-2 will dock with IS-1002 at orbital altitude as opposed to the higher altitude of the 
MEV-1/IS-901 docking.225 The MEVs represent a crucial first step for in-orbit servicing. 
SpaceLogistics is pursuing a follow-on for MEVs to enhance their servicing capability. 
This new effort involves a robotic spacecraft that will dock with satellites and attach pods 
to client satellites to provide station-keeping services.226 While the on-orbit servicing 
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industry is still in its infancy, Northrop Grumman claims multiple clients are interested in 
this new system.227  
The success of the MEV has also caught the attention of DARPA. On March 4, 
2020, less than a month after the successful docking of MEV-1, DARPA named Northrop 
Grumman as a partner in the Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites (RSGS) 
program.228 The goal of the RSGS is to developing a robotic servicing vehicle to extend 
the service life and enhance the resiliency of U.S.-government and commercial satellites 
in GEO.229 The RSGS spacecraft will be able to repair or add components to satellites to 
extend their service lives or add additional capabilities.230 Northrop Grumman is replacing 
Space Systems Loral (SSL), a subsidiary of Maxar Technologies, which dropped out of the 
partnership due to financial concerns.231 DARPA and the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory 
(NRL) will provide the robotic components along with the rest of the servicing payload, 
which include sensors and tools developed the NRL. Northrop Grumman will provide the 
bus technologies sourced from MEV to build the actual spacecraft, along with launch 
services and operational management.232 While the MEV itself was developed within the 
commercial sector, DARPA saw the value of its capabilities and is incorporating Northrop 
Grumman’s expertise into the RSGS effort. Construction and testing of the servicing 
components are expected to begin in 2021, with a target launch date for the spacecraft in 
2023.233 The spacecraft is then expected to begin servicing missions in GEO in 2024.234 
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The RSGS can be viewed as a foundational program for the development of a 
domestic ADR capability for two reasons. The first is the proven rendezvous and docking 
capabilities of the MEV technologies within the RSGS spacecraft. The RSGS mission plans 
to add a remote inspection capability, where the spacecraft circles the target satellite in an 
inspection process to establish the safest method to dock and service the satellite.235 These 
capabilities will be necessary for remediation missions as well. Whether the target is to be 
serviced or remediated, the mission spacecraft needs to be able to dock safely with the 
target in a manner that does not produce any damage or fragmentation. Second, Northrop 
Grumman will manage the initial RSGS launch.236 This handling represents a public–
private partnership in which the commercial sector is operating the spacecraft using 
technologies developed by both parties. Furthermore. DARPA intends to turn these 
servicing technologies over to the private sector once the systems are proven to be 
operational.237 Turning these capabilities over to the private sector is intended to establish 
national leadership in the OOS industry.238 The OOS capabilities developed in this 
program can then be utilized to service both government and commercial satellites in GEO, 
with government satellites being serviced for an established fixed-cost.239 This model of 
operation aligns with partnership efforts in NASA, with both government and private 
operators cooperating on the development of technologies, and then handing off these 
capabilities to the private sector to operate to establish global leadership in the commercial 
sector. 
The successful docking of MEV-1 and IS-901 demonstrate that docking with and 
moving derelict satellites is possible with existing technology. Additionally, it has proven 
that private-sector ambition and innovation can find solutions to a complex problem. Using 
components and technologies from previously successful spacecraft, Northrop Grumman 
and SpaceLogistics generated a completely new system that has a wide range of 
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applications.240 Northrop Grumman and Intelsat are negotiating for additional MEV 
missions to extend the life of more satellites, which shows that a potential market for 
commercial OOS exists.241 The technological breakthroughs the MEV achieved have also 
jumpstarted the RSGS program, which is now on track to develop a diverse OOS capability 
in GEO for both government and commercial satellites. This initiative will only strengthen 
the United States’ position of leadership in OOS following the MEV’s successes. The 
technologies developed and the experience gained in these programs will provide an 
excellent foundation upon which a domestic ADR program can be built. 
2. NASA’s OSAM-1 
NASA’s Goddard Spaceflight Center is developing a spacecraft (OSAM-1) for the 
On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (OSAM) program.242 Similar to the 
RSGS, this program’s intent is to establish OOS capabilities. However, the OSAM program 
will be conducting operations in LEO as opposed to GEO. NASA approved this mission’s 
budget and schedule in May 2020; no launch date has been set as of November 2020.243 
The OSAM-1 mission was previously known as the RESTORE-L mission; however, the 
addition of new mission objectives resulted in a name change.244 NASA is the owner and 
operator of the OSAM-1 spacecraft being built by SSL for a demonstration mission to 
refuel the Landsat-7 satellite.245 This mission has a level of complexity not found in MEV 
operations. Upon docking with the target, the OSAM-1 will refuel the target instead of 
staying attached and providing station-keeping services. These functions will be carried 
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out with three robotic arms that will perform such tasks as removing fuel filler caps and 
attaching fuel lines.246 The ability to perform these types of precise operations will allow 
follow-on spacecraft to refuel a wide range of satellites, not just ones of a specific design. 
The OSAM-1 differs from the MEV spacecraft in that it can refuel or repair the 
target and then moves on. The OSAM-1 spacecraft is more closely aligned with the 
DARPA/Northrop Grumman RSGS vehicle because it intends to provide a variety of 
servicing options for satellites in orbit. Both spacecraft will require the ability to 
rendezvous and dock with a target, along with the ability to perform autonomous dexterous 
functions using robotic components to perform the servicing actions. These goals align 
with that of the RSGS; the primary difference is the orbital altitudes in which the spacecraft 
operate. 
The OSAM-1 will be carrying the Space Infrastructure Dexterous Robot (SPIDER), 
which will assemble a 9-ft. antenna and manufacture a composite beam in a demonstration 
of on-orbit manufacturing and construction.247 The addition of this module facilitated the 
name change to OSAM-1. The ability to manufacture and assemble on-orbit will allow 
specific tools or parts needed for servicing missions to be created. In other words, future 
spacecraft will not have to carry specific spare parts or tools but will have the capability of 
manufacturing the needed equipment after being tasked. The follow-on mission in the 
OSAM program, OSAM-2, will manufacture and assemble a solar array to provide power 
for the spacecraft.248 The manufacturing and assembly systems developed in the OSAM 
program will be shared with the Artemis program, NASA’s human deep-space exploration 
mission to the moon and Mars.249 
The OSAM-1 is the first step in a series of technology demonstrations to develop 
robotic systems capable of servicing, repairing, assembling, and manufacturing outside of 
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Earth.250 This first mission will demonstrate capabilities that will allow satellites to 
maintain functionality beyond their designed lifespan, and possibly create fewer derelict 
satellites in orbit. The flexibility to service a wide variety of client satellites through 
autonomous robotics will increase the market value of these systems, an important factor 
since NASA intends to turn over these technologies to commercial operators in an effort 
to boost the domestic servicing industry.251 This goal aligns with DARPA’s with regard 
to commercial participation; both programs intend to hand over the technologies to the 
private sector to maintain commercial leadership in the field. 
When the United States begins any remediation efforts, it can draw on the 
capabilities of the MEV, RSGS, and OSAM program for valuable data regarding 
rendezvous and docking. NASA’s Goddard Spaceflight Center, home to the OSAM 
program and the Hubble Space Telescope, would be an ideal location to manage such an 
effort given the experience this center has in complex spacecraft development. OOS 
technology has reached a level of maturity in the MEV that has enabled commercial 
operations to begin and future missions to be negotiated. The MEV’s success has resulted 
in the RSGS partnership with DARPA to develop an OOS spacecraft for servicing 
government and commercial satellites in GEO that will be operated by a commercial 
partner. This arrangement is very similar the one NASA created during COTS. The OSS 
capabilities developed by NASA in the OSAM program are also intended to be handed 
over to the commercial sector to execute OOS missions. Both DARPA and NASA 
recognize the commercial sector is better suited to handle these missions after 
development; it frees up government agencies to pursue other goals while allowing the 
commercial sector to grow and lead in the OOS marketplace. The knowledge and 
experience gained in the pursuit of OOS capabilities are a solid foundation upon which a 
future remediation program can be built.  
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C. FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS IN REMEDIATION 
While no operational remediation missions exist, other nations have made progress 
in developing the capabilities needed for a remediation program. These foreign efforts are 
being conducted in both the public and private sectors, and partnerships are being 
established between the two to create operational remediation programs. Just as important, 
these efforts represent a head start for foreign competitors in a potential marketplace for 
remediation services. With the threat debris poses and the need for remediation missions 
established, the United States cannot allow leadership in this field to fall to a foreign party. 
Given the critical role satellites play in U.S. homeland security and the economy as a whole, 
a domestic remediation program must be developed to protect government and commercial 
satellites. Furthermore. the economic benefit of a robust commercial space sector has been 
established with the data from COTS; the job growth and taxation of domestic launch 
services has more than paid for the investment of government funds. To keep the domestic 
space industry competitive globally, remediation efforts must begin to establish U.S. 
leadership in the new remediation services market. While the programs highlighted in this 
section are being developed for remediation missions, the evidence will show the gap 
between the United States and its foreign competitors is not large. However, unless action 
is taken quickly to establish a domestic remediation program, the United States will quickly 
fall behind in developing these capabilities. 
1. Demonstration Missions 
Foreign efforts in the field of ADR include demonstration missions, in which 
spacecraft in orbit have conducted experiments to develop the capabilities needed to 
remediate space debris. The demonstration mission of the RemoveDEBRIS spacecraft is 
one such effort, which was released into orbit from the ISS in June 2018.252 The 
RemoveDEBRIS program was a consortium of 10 partners led by the Surrey Space Center 
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in the United Kingdom and funded by the European Union.253 Other notable partners in 
this group include several subsidiaries of Airbus and the Ariane Group, major players in 
the European aerospace industry.254 This program shows a joint effort between both public 
and private actors to gather data that will benefit both. The purpose of the mission was to 
perform demonstrations of different technologies that might be used to remediate debris 
and gather data on the strengths and challenges of each technology. The techniques 
demonstrated in this program include the use of a vision-based navigation (VBN) system, 
a harpoon, a net, and a drag sail, all of which could be used for future remediation 
efforts.255  
The demonstration of the VBN system was successful in its identification of both 
strengths and limitations of the technology. The data provided will be of particular value 
to future efforts in the field. The VBN systems used onboard cameras and flash imaging 
light detection and ranging (LiDAR), to track a target successfully to rendezvous with it. 
The results of the demonstration matched expectations for the camera system, while the 
LiDAR achieved mixed results.256 The LiDAR deviated from expected results when 
significant backlight occurred behind the target.257 The identification of this flaw will help 
future researchers enhance the technology. A second successful experiment was the use of 
a harpoon fired by cold gas generators on a target at a range of 1.5 m.258 On-board cameras 
showed the harpoon hit the target dead center and imbedded itself into the target.259 A 
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harpoon could be used in future remediation missions to capture debris targets and reel 
them into the remediating spacecraft as opposed to having the remediating spacecraft 
rendezvous with the target directly. 
The demonstration on the use of a net to capture a debris target was a partial 
success. The plan for the experiment was to fire the 5 m.-wide net at the target from a range 
of 7 m.260 Upon deployment, the net only opened to a radius of 4 m., and the range to 
target was 11 m. The net did impact and enclose the target; however, the longer-than-
anticipated distance between spacecraft and target prevented the onboard cameras from 
confirming full-enclosure of the target.261 A net could be used in a similar manner as the 
harpoon for future remediation efforts; a target could be captured by a net and then moved 
by a remediating spacecraft. The drag sail experiment failed to achieve any of the desired 
results. When the system was activated and the process to deploy the sail initiated, the 
deployment motors for the sail mechanisms failed.262 With the sail deployed, the cross-
sectional area of the spacecraft would increase dramatically by creating drag and slowing 
the spacecraft down to reenter the atmosphere.263 However, the RemoveDEBRIS 
spacecraft was deployed in an orbit that would allow for natural orbital decay within 25 
years. The unsuccessful net demonstration still resulted in useful data; lessons learned 
during the design of the drag sail experiment were incorporated into another mission, 
InflateSail, which resulted in a successful deorbiting of the cubesat from 500 km in just 
three months’ time.264 RemoveDEBRIS was an important step in developing remediation 
technologies due to conducting experiments in-orbit versus a lab setting. The results of 
these experiments can be built upon for future efforts. Furthermore. this program 
demonstrated partnership between the private and public sectors in working toward the 
goal of remediating debris. 
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While RemoveDEBRIS provided data on the use of varied methods to remediate 
debris, using the VBN system to track a target was one of the mission’s most successful 
components. This system will provide future remediation spacecraft the ability to 
rendezvous, inspect, and capture debris targets safely. The United States has already put 
this capability into commercial operation with the MEVs. The ability to rendezvous and 
dock in GEO would not have been possible without these technologies. However, the 
lessons learned from the other experiments of RemoveDEBRIS provide a foundation for 
future European efforts in remediation. Indeed, the lessons learned in constructing the 
unsuccessful drag-sail experiment resulted in a successful deployment of the technology in 
a later experiment. These initial efforts in development provide the RemoveDEBRIS 
partners with a head start in these technologies. 
Astroscale is a multinational company and is the world’s first company devoted to 
remediating space debris.265 In 2020, the company intends to launch a technology 
demonstrator spacecraft called the End of Life Services by Astroscale demonstration 
(ELSA-d).266 ELSA-d will demonstrate technologies for rendezvous and docking with 
cooperative and uncooperative targets using a proprietary docking system, and will also 
perform a search and inspection function.267 Additionally, ELSA-d’s flight plan includes 
a rendezvous and docking maneuver with a target tumbling in all three axis to test the 
technologies needed to dock with a cooperative debris target tumbling in a similar 
manner.268 Like the RemoveDEBRIS mission, ELSA-d will not be removing any existing 
debris, but will be deploying its own targets for demonstrations. ELSA-d differs from 
RemoveDEBRIS in the type of technologies to be demonstrated. The searching of a debris 
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target and the docking with an uncooperative target are new experiments, and if successful, 
will be key technologies needed for future remediation efforts. Future remediation 
spacecraft will have to search for targets using onboard sensors, and many debris targets 
are tumbling; ELSA-d will provide important data of how to overcome these challenges 
for future efforts. 
Another significant factor of ELSA-d is that it is solely a commercial effort.269 
Astroscale CEO Nobu Okada created the company due to the growing threat of space 
debris and the lack of progress in addressing the threat from the United Nations or other 
regulatory agencies.270 Okada intends to establish Astroscale as a leader in remediation 
technologies and drive the development of this new market.271 Astroscale has grown due 
to investments from the private sector; the company has received over $102 million from 
outside investors that believe in the commercial viability of remediation missions. The 
company also received a $4.5 million grant from the Innovation Tokyo Project to develop 
commercial plans to remediate space debris.272 
Astroscale is demonstrating a level of ambition seen with SpaceLogistics/Northrop 
Grumman with the MEV. Both companies have identified a potential future market in 
space operations and have invested accordingly to be a leader in these fields. Both 
spacecraft will rely on the ability to rendezvous and dock with their targets; the only 
difference is one spacecraft will prolong the life of its target, while the other will dispose 
of its target. The MEV has already docked in GEO and is in operation, while ELSA-d still 
has not launched. This comparison is further evidence that the technology gap between the 
United States and other nations is not insurmountable. 
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2. Public–Private Partnerships in Remediation Programs 
The progress made in foreign remediation efforts is not limited to demonstration 
missions. Currently, two partnerships between foreign space agencies and the private sector 
are planning missions to remove debris objects from space. These partnerships are similar 
because both are targeting single debris objects, and the public sector is financing both 
efforts.273 The existence of these programs provides evidence that foreign space agencies 
believe the threat of debris has risen to the level where remediation is necessary. If these 
programs prove viable, the United States will fall behind in the development of remediation 
capabilities unless action is taken to keep pace. The agencies involved, the Japan Aerospace 
Exploration Agency (JAXA), and the ESA, have entrusted the private sector to develop the 
technologies to begin remediation efforts.  
Building off ELSA-d’s research, Astroscale is developing a follow-on project in a 
partnership with JAXA. The company was selected to develop a spacecraft capable of 
inspecting a rocket body in orbit for a future removal mission (CRD2).274 JAXA 
categorizes the target as non-cooperative; therefore, this mission will be able to refine the 
techniques used in the ELSA-d mission during the non-cooperative capture.275 These two 
operations starkly differ in that ELSA-d’s target will have a docking plate to utilize while 
docking with the target, whereas the rocket body being remediated during CRD2 will not 
have such a feature and will be significantly more massive.276 Astroscale has until March 
2023 to complete an inspection mission during which time the target will be assessed and 
data gathered to develop a remediation plan. Astroscale will have until March 2026, to 
complete the removal of the target.277 Astroscale is looking for potential commercial 
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partners for the mission, and the expectation is that JAXA will provide most of the 
financing.278  
In an effort similar to NASA’s partnership with SpaceX and Orbital Science during 
COTS, JAXA is not providing design specifics to Astroscale for the remediation 
spacecraft. For this reason, the effort to remove this rocket body is divided into two 
segments. This inspection mission will allow Astroscale to refine its on-orbit inspection 
capabilities further, as well as to develop a solution tailored to the target.279 JAXA is 
allowing Astroscale to use its expertise to devise the best solution instead of directing the 
company on how to proceed. 
ClearSpace-1 is a partnership between the European Space Agency and commercial 
partner ClearSpace to remove a debris object in orbit since 2013.280 This program is a 
component of ESA’s Active Debris Removal/In-Orbit Servicing (ADRIOS) project, 
intended to develop the technologies needed to service satellites and remove debris 
objects.281 Swiss startup ClearSpace, comprised of personnel from across Europe, was 
competitively selected as the recipient of the contract targeting a 2025 launch.282 
ClearSpace is forming a consortium of partners to build the spacecraft for the mission, 
while the company plans to be the sole designer.283 The ESA will supply the components 
for the navigation and guidance systems, a vision-based AI systems, and robotic arms for 
capturing the target.284 The ESA signed a contract with ClearSpace for €86 million 
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(approximately $104 million USD) to pay for the mission.285 In addition to the funding 
from the ESA, ClearSpace has raised €24 million from commercial investors to finance the 
mission.286  
A Vespa payload adaptor from a 2013 ESA Vega rocket launch is the target for 
ClearSpace-1.287 The agency describes the significance in choosing this target, “With a 
mass of 100 kg, the Vespa is close in size to a small satellite, while its relatively simple 
shape and sturdy construction make it a suitable first goal, before progressing to larger, 
more challenging captures by follow-up missions—eventually including multi-object 
capture.”288 The ESA describes the mission profile, “the ClearSpace-1 ‘chaser’ will be 
launched into a lower 500-km orbit for commissioning and critical tests before being raised 
to the target orbit for rendezvous and capture using a quartet of robotic arms under ESA 
supervision. The combined chaser plus Vespa will then be deorbited to burn up in the 
atmosphere.”289 The use of robotic arms is very different from the other missions 
previously discussed. This method might be used on debris targets of various sizes and 
shapes, which could enable the capture of rocket bodies or other objects with unusual 
dimensions. 
ClearSpace-1’s and JAXA’s CRD2 significance to future remediation efforts is 
considerable. These missions are not intended to perform small-scale technology 
demonstrations for research purposes; their objectives are the removal of debris targets 
resembling the massive derelicts posing significant risk in LEO. A successful removal of 
the Japanese rocket body and Vespa payload adapter will be a significant step forward for 
future remediation missions and give credibility to the overall remediation effort. If these 
programs are successful, it will also further validate public–private partnerships as a viable 
model for future efforts. The funding structure of these programs differs from the COTS 








However, both these partnerships allow the private sector partner to design the technologies 
needed to complete the mission. They can leverage the strengths of their organizations to 
find the best solution. CRD2 and ClearSpace-1 show both public and private sector 
motivation to address the debris threat overseas; the United States must follow suit. 
CRD2 and ClearSpace-1 show clear initiative on the part of JAXA and the ESA. 
These agencies recognize the threat of orbital debris and are reacting accordingly. 
However, the technologies to remediate debris in these programs are not high on NASA’s 
TRL scale. This scale, in which 1 represents the lowest level of readiness, and 9 represents 
an operational system, shows much work must still be completed before these spacecrafts 
are ready for operations.290 ClearSpace acknowledges the use of robotic arms to capture 
the Vespa payload adapter is innovative, but is unproven and has a low TRL.291 Astroscale 
has not conducted its ELSA-d demonstration mission, nor its inspection flight of the target 
rocket body within the CRD program; therefore, the systems it is developing are far from 
operational as well. The United States possesses a TRL-9 capability in rendezvous and 
docking with the MEV, with the same systems being used in the RSGS spacecraft. Having 
established this capability means that any future effort on the part of the United States will 
have an advantage in this area of remediation systems. Additionally, the use of public–
private partnerships, with RSGS domestically and the JAXA-ESA efforts internationally, 
further validate this model of project management for a domestic remediation program. 
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V. A PATH FORWARD  
This thesis has detailed the threat that space debris poses to U.S. satellites in orbit and 
the conditions that allowed that threat to grow. Furthermore. it examines barriers to 
implementing a debris remediation program. The recent growth in competition and capability 
in the commercial space sector now demonstrates the ability to overcome the barriers to 
remediation efforts, along with providing evidence that the United States possesses the talent 
and experience to develop the needed technologies. This chapter provides a path forward for 
a new public–private partnership to begin the development of remediation capabilities through 
the actions of Congress, the National Space Council, NASA, and international agreements. 
The remediation program components are all within reach; the nation must only make the 
decision to start. 
A. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Bold action from Congress must provide the funding and framework for an ADR 
program to be built on, including legislation that will create enforceable regulations intended 
to eliminate debris-generating activities. National space policies and directives led to the 
creation of mitigation standards that eventually became commonplace internationally; yet, a 
lack of any enforcement mechanism to hold offending parties accountable has produced an 
untenable situation in orbit. A Clean Space Act passed by Congress should include funding 
for developing a domestic ADR capability. Both public and private research shows that ADR 
missions are necessary to stabilize congested orbits; compliance with current mitigation 
standards will not remove dangerous objects already in orbit. Building off the language in 
SPD-3, which directed the creation of a debris removal capability, Congress must budget for 
the needed systems to carry out ADR missions. The ESA has signed an €86 million 
(approximately $104 million USD) contract with ClearSpace to remediate the Vespa payload 
adapter in 2025; this figure can provide a starting point in terms of development cost, 
depending on the scale of the program to be initiated.292 A budget of this size may be 
sufficient to begin the development of a remediation system to perform a demo mission in 
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orbit to validate the technology. Such success may lead to follow-on programs and larger 
budgets. If the National Space Council (NSpC) and NASA believe a larger scale effort is 
required earlier, additional funding may be needed. Considering satellite-based technologies 
drive $5 trillion in annual revenues domestically and are critical to national defense and 
homeland security capabilities, an initial investment of $100 million–$200 million for a 
remediation capability represents a wise decision. 
A precedent for such congressional action can be found in the 1972 Clean Water Act 
(CWA); legislation passed to prevent municipal and industrial actions that led to the 
contamination of water resources.293 Additionally, the new statutes should contain language 
that will indemnify the U.S. government of liability for any damage caused by commercially 
owned objects in orbit in violation of these statutes launched after implementation. The 
intention of a legislative act, such as the Clean Water Act, is to force industrial or municipal 
parties’ compliance to a regulatory standard when that standard may not align with these 
parties’ primary objectives. Claudia Copeland calls this type of legislation a “technology-
forcing statute,” due to the pressure it applies on regulated individuals or organizations to 
innovate to achieve compliance with established standards. This type of action from Congress 
can create an enforcement capability for executive branch departments to generate compliance 
with already established orbital debris mitigation standards. Both public and private launch 
and satellite providers would be forced to implement new technologies to comply with the 
new law. Regulatory pressure, like competitive pressure, would result in technical innovation 
on the part of both launch providers and satellite operators. 
Regulatory changes that will force the U.S. space industry to develop new 
technologies, therefore increasing costs and reducing profit, will be met with resistance. A 
real-world example of such resistance occurred in April 2020, when the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) proposed regulatory changes that would reduce the risk 
of debris-generating events.294 The proposed FCC rule change would have required satellite 
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operators to provide detailed probability assessments on the likelihood of collision and the 
successful post-mission disposal of satellites, require all satellites orbiting above 250 miles 
(ISS altitude) to have collision-avoidance maneuvering capability, provide detailed flight 
plans to the Air Force to ensure accurate tracking, indemnify the U.S. government for costs 
associated with any international liability claims, and post bonds to ensure post-mission 
disposal of satellites.295 
Several companies, space industry trade groups, and the White House Science 
Committee vocalized their objections to the new FCC rules and argued that these changes 
would result in hardship for smaller satellite operators.296 In particular, the Commercial 
Spaceflight Federation (CSF) argued that such changes would result in increased costs due to 
a required redesign of existing satellites and risk derailing U.S. leadership in the nascent global 
small-satellite market.297 The NSpC, which the FCC is part of, agreed to delay the 
implementation of the FCC rule changes to preserve U.S. leadership in the global space 
industry.298 This hesitancy to adapt to new regulations is identified as a common theme by 
Gerard and Lave; the lobbying by the CSF aligns with this research.299  
However, the implementation of the Clean Air Act of 1970 faced similar resistance 
from the automotive industry, and that legislation was passed with “overwhelming 
congressional support.”300 Furthermore. as much as the automobile industry lobbied against 
the legislation, the new law led to the installation of catalytic converters on 80 percent of new 
cars manufactured in 1975 and more than a 50-percent reduction in hydrocarbons along with 
 
295 King, 1–2. 
296 Caleb Henry, “FCC Urged to Delay Vote on New Space Debris Regulations,” SpaceNews, April 
17, 2020, https://spacenews.com/fcc-urged-to-delay-vote-on-new-space-debris-regulations/. 
297 Eric W. Stallmer, CSF Letter to Chairman Pai on Orbital Debris NPRM (Washington, DC: 
Commercial Spaceflight Federation, 2020), 3, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/104161265605622/
CSF%20Letter%20to%20Charman%20Pai%20on%20Orbital%20Debris%20NPRM.pdf. 
298 Jeff Foust, “National Space Council in Discussions on FCC Orbital Debris Policies,” SpaceNews, 
May 7, 2020, https://spacenews.com/national-space-council-in-discussions-on-fcc-orbital-debris-policies/. 
299 David Gerard and Lester B. Lave, “Implementing Technology-Forcing Policies: The 1970 Clean 
Air Act Amendments and the Introduction of Advanced Automotive Emissions Controls in the United 
States,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 72, no. 7 (September 2005): 764, https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.techfore.2004.08.003. 
300 Gerard and Lave, 766. 
72 
a one-third reduction in carbon monoxide.301 Research by Gerard and Lave suggests the 
Clean Air Act was successful in reducing emissions from newly manufactured automobiles 
because Congress set specific standards and did not delegate this responsibility to a regulatory 
agency.302 Additionally, the implementation of specific performance standards versus 
technology standards may have contributed to the successful reduction in emissions.303 
The economic and national threat that a loss of satellite capabilities presents 
necessitates Congress looking past lobbying from industry and passing a comprehensive 
Clean Space Act to give the executive branch the mandate to enforce compliance with debris 
mitigation standards. This new space marketplace would result in investments through not 
only a mandate, but also competition, since launch providers and satellite operators would be 
in a race against each other to gain an edge within the new regulatory environment. While 
satellite manufacturers may face the economic burden of implementing collision-avoidance 
systems or carrying additional fuel for end-of-life disposal, this legislative step is needed to 
trigger the industry to evolve into a sector that is sustainable for future operations. 
B. NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL 
The NSpC, whose members include secretaries or administrators of NASA, the 
Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, Department of Commerce, and many 
other departments and agencies, steers space policy decisions affecting both commercial and 
public space programs. The U.S. Vice President chairs this council. With regard to the creation 
of a remediation program based on a public–private partnership model, the NSpC should 
establish NASA as the lead agency in coordinating this effort, based on the agency’s past 
success using this framework. However, successes in the field of OOS and the knowledge 
gained thereof in the private sector and in partnership with the Department of Defense 
(DARPA specifically) should be leveraged as well. The NSpC should make every effort to 
incorporate technical data or personnel from related programs to stand up any ADR program. 
Again, these efforts must be focused on establishing a remediation capability, not specific 
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technologies, in pursuit of ADR systems. This focus will allow for agility and innovation on 
the part of participating private sector partners and not limit their research and development 
to a narrow set of technological goals. 
The NSpC must prioritize what debris targets should be remediated first and make 
their disposal a priority for any initial ADR effort. The massive and long-lived debris objects 
between 775 and 1,500 km in orbital altitude need to be the primary focus of these early 
missions. Research shows the amount of fragmentation generated and the longevity of that 
fragmentation present a threat greater than the risk of collisions in the lower altitudes of LEO. 
Once ADR missions begin the removal of these massive U.S.-owned objects in the higher 
regions of LEO, the NSpC can pursue a low-LEO capability and possibly leverage the 
breakthroughs already developed during initial ADR operations. While establishing a viable 
domestic remediation capability is the primary goal, the NSPC and the Department of State 
need to establish plans for cooperating with other nations to remove foreign-owned debris. 
With a Congressional mandate requiring compliance to federal statutes pertaining to 
debris generating activities and post-mission disposal, the NSpC will be tasked with 
implementing the processes and procedures to gain compliance. It is imperative that any 
action taken by NSpC agencies should be in pursuit of compliance with performance 
standards in lieu of technology standards. This action falls in line with the research from 
Gerard and Lave, along with NASA reporting that shows the challenges pursuing specific 
designs presented to the Constellation program.304 
The FAA and the FCC will play the largest role in the execution of new federal policy, 
with the former licensing launch activities and the latter licensing satellites in orbit. Both 
agencies should approach the execution of these policies with caution and in cooperation with 
the commercial sector to allow for compliance without stunting the growth of the evolving 
commercial sector. This approach may involve a grace period to develop the necessary 
capabilities to comply with the standards, a practice found in both the Clean Water Act and 
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the Clean Air Act.305 Building off a concept proposed by Joseph N. Pelton, the FAA could 
collect payment from launch providers upon licensing a launch to be deposited into an account 
in which remediation efforts could be funded.306 Pelton elaborates that to encourage 
compliance with debris mitigation standards further, portions of these payments could be 
refunded to launch providers if it could be established that the launch did not generate any 
debris.307 Furthermore. additional refunds should be administered to satellite operators who 
comply with mitigation standards and perform end-of-life maneuvers to deorbit satellites. 
If launch providers of satellite operators do not comply with mitigation standards, the 
statutes passed by Congress gives these agencies the authority to assess fines. If an ADR 
capability proves viable, fines may be assessed to satellite operators who fail to remove their 
satellites within the required time window that results in a fee assessed periodically (month or 
annually). This method may put enough financial pressure on offending operators to pay for 
a removal mission instead of paying a one-time fee and leaving their hardware in orbit. 
Additionally, these regulations will force other satellite operators to invest in the necessary 
hardware to perform end-of-life maneuvers. The money spent by the auto industry to comply 
with the Clean Air Act is evidence that this type of pressure is effective in forcing industry to 
invest in new technology. 
Additionally, the NSpC may examine a program of tax initiatives or grants for 
satellites providers to leverage to establish a maneuvering and deorbit capability to comply 
with standards. This method falls in line with the synergistic relationship the public and 
private space sectors have established over the past two decades. Federal assistance in 
developing commercial capabilities has proven successful at NASA in both large-scale 
programs, such as COTS, but also in initiatives that benefit smaller projects, such as the Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) 
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programs.308 Providing assistance to satellite operators or manufacturers that might not have 
the capabilities to comply with more stringent standards could allow them to keep their 
business domestically and not purchase services from foreign firms in an effort to circumvent 
the new statutes. This approach potentially addresses some of the concerns brought forth by 
the CSF that fears a mandate may drive business overseas in an effort to reduce costs. 
Furthermore, this type of program falls in line with previous national space policies that 
encouraged the growth of the commercial space sector. 
For any initiatives the NSpC creates to gain compliance with a Clean Space Act, a 
periodic review of its effectiveness is imperative to ensure that these measures result in 
compliance with congressional statutes. However, these reviews need to ensure compliance 
in a manner with the least possible impact to private sector growth. These periodic evaluations 
should review the efficacy of fines as a method of compliance, in addition to the effectiveness 
of any initiative that uses bonds or deposits to fund remediation efforts. If remediation 
missions are no longer required due to increased compliance, Pelton suggests a sunset clause 
could be established to refund any deposited funds to contributing parties in the event those 
funds were no longer needed.309 The creation of such a provision would demonstrate 
transparency on the part of the FAA and FCC (or any other agency charged with managing 
said fund) and illustrates that it is not simply an additional tax to be spent on efforts outside 
of the ADR mission. 
C. NASA AND COMMERCIAL PARTNERS 
NASA needs to utilize a public–private partnership model as a foundation for any 
ADR efforts. A partnership model based on NASA’s COTS program should be developed 
once specific capabilities are identified. NASA should release a request for proposals to the 
commercial space industry in a process similar the COTS program. SpaceLogisitics/Northrop 
Grumman stands as a strong candidate for this type of partnership as DARPA is leveraging 
the success of the MEV for the RSGS spacecraft. NASA has an opportunity to do the same 
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but it should focus on remediation. However, seeking multiple proposals from industry and 
utilizing the experience and talent of the whole sector may result in multiple viable options. 
By reviewing multiple proposals, NASA has an opportunity to spread research and 
development funding with more than one partner, depending on the level of appropriated 
funds. It is in the agency’s best interest to keep its options open and review multiple proposals 
and leverage the innovation in the private sector that it helped evolve. 
The proposals submitted by industry need to be comprehensive and include the details 
of the technologies needed to develop the proposed system, a management plan on how the 
company will run the program, and how the commercial end of development funding will be 
provided. In providing a complete picture of the program, NASA can make better 
determinations of viability. Program management needs to avoid the “technology first” 
mindset that has been identified as a factor in program delays and cost overruns.310 
Commercial partners should be selected based on the strength of all aspects of their proposals. 
This method served NASA well during COTS and should be utilized again. Once selections 
have been made, both sides of the partnership should develop a schedule with agreed upon 
milestones to review progress and distribute funding. This method will hold both parties 
accountable and allow all parties involved better situational awareness of the entire program. 
Once development is complete, the responsibility of remediation missions will fall to the 
commercial partners utilizing fixed-priced contracts for services in a marketplace where 
NASA is one of many customers paying for ADR services. Such a marketplace represents the 
embryonic stage of a new line of services that will be available to satellite operators. Iridium 
Communications stated it would pay for remediation services for 30 of its inoperable satellites 
currently in LEO, which demonstrated the beginning of a customer base for commercial ADR 
services.311 
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The structure of the program should include a program office located at Goddard 
Spaceflight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. Goddard is the logical location for the program 
office, given that most of the NASA expertise needed for this effort will be located at this 
center. This NASA center is currently working on the OSAM program; the knowledge and 
experience related to the OOS technologies of this program can be applied to the ADR 
mission. Programs of note that involve complex autonomous or robotic systems include the 
Curiosity (Mars Science Laboratory) rover and the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft; the latter briefly 
landed on an asteroid passing near Earth in October 2020 and collected a sample to bring 
back.312 The NASA Jet Propulsion Lab in Pasadena, California, employs personnel with 
additional experience and expertise in related projects. Robotic missions developed at this 
facility include the Spirit, Opportunity, Pathfinder, and Sojourner Mars rovers. In addition, 
the planned Europa Lander mission is looking for life on one of Jupiter’s icy moons.313 Both 
NASA and any commercial partners can utilize the expertise found at research facilities within 
these centers as a model of shared learning, which the literature on public private partnerships 
highlights as a contributor to success.314 
Between inoperable satellites and derelict rocket bodies, the United States owns 41 
objects (21 rocket bodies and 20 payloads) between the orbital altitudes of 650 and 1,500 km, 
which should be the initial target list for the program.315 These orbits contain both massive 
debris objects and a high density of debris that necessitate ADR operations. The mass of the 
objects in these orbits would result in large amounts of fragments generated during a collision, 
and the density of the debris population increases the likelihood of a collision.  
To maximize the innovation, talents, and technical strengths of potential commercial 
partners, exact design specifications for remediation spacecraft must be avoided to circumvent 
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the identified design challenges of the Constellation program as discussed Chapter II. These 
lessons were applied during COTS with positive results. The commercial partners designed 
and delivered spacecraft capable of cargo deliveries to the ISS without specific design requests 
from NASA. Considering the success of this decision in COTS, this remediation program 
should follow suit and not specify remediation methods.  
D. INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS 
While the threat of space debris is global, the United States must lead in efforts to 
combat it. Several nations own the debris currently residing in orbit, and many nations would 
feel the effect in any reduction of services due to a collision event. While no global response 
has addressed this issue, Megan Ansdell proposes that an international response is not ideal 
for remediation but should be led by one country. As Ansdell notes, “This [U.S. leadership] 
would accelerate technology development and demonstration, which would, in turn, build up 
trust and hasten international participation in space debris removal.”316 The United States has 
a chance to lead the global effort in remediation; it does not have to concede this role to Japan 
or the European Union. Furthermore. the 2020 National Space Policy calls for the United 
States to take the lead in the development of innovative space technologies. This policy calls 
on the federal government to “preserve and expand United States leadership in the 
development of innovative space technologies, services, and operations. Work with 
likeminded international and private partners, to prevent the transfer of sensitive space 
capabilities to those who threaten the interests of the United States, its allies, and its supporting 
industrial base.”317 This policy demonstrates that leadership in a field, such as debris 
remediation, represents a national imperative. 
The United States can establish a leadership role by working with a state that has a 
history of cooperation with the United States, Russia. The research shows that while the 
United States owns debris residing in at-risk orbits, Russia owns a much higher percentage. 
Russia owns 137 massive derelict objects in the at-risk region of LEO, which far outnumbers 
 
316 Ansdell, “Active Space Debris Removal,” 18. 
317 White House, National Space Policy, 6. 
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the 41 U.S. objects.318 Removal of foreign-owned objects will be necessary to mitigate the 
risk of collision in these orbits. No U.S. remediation program can remove these debris objects 
without either permission from the owning-state or an update to existing international treaties. 
While the United States and Russia may publicly disagree on many topics, space operations 
have been an area of cooperation for years. The joining of an American Apollo spacecraft and 
a Soviet Soyuz in orbit during 1975 changed the nature of the space race between the two 
nations.319 The ISS is the greatest example of cooperation between the two states. The 
cooperation in the ISS has been the result of the United States treating the Russians as equals 
in space as opposed to rivals and has taken an approach of working toward common goals to 
foster better relations.320 The threat of space debris affects all spacecraft in orbit; debris 
remediation can be a further example of working toward a common and mutually beneficial 
goal. Future research should examine potential diplomatic resolutions that will allow for U.S.-
Russian cooperation for the remediation of hazardous Russian debris and provide a 
framework to be applied for joint operations with other states as well. Further momentum will 
be gained if the United States and Russia can come to agreement concerning the removal of 
massive Russian debris in the higher regions of LEO. 
Beyond U.S.-Russian cooperation to remove specific debris objects, international 
treaties and agreements must be amended or updated to address the realities of the debris 
issue. This action becomes especially necessary if the ESA, JAXA, and NASA field ADR 
programs. The United Nation’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(UNCOPUOS) should address the issues of ownership of derelict objects, clarify ownership 
of objects when multiple states are involved in a launch, and update liability for damages 
given the growth of the commercial space sector. All the previous issues were highlighted as 
significant challenges in the literature reviewed for this thesis. Specifically, updates to Article 
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VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, along with the 1972 Liability Convention and the 1974 
Registration Convention, may resolve the issues highlighted previously.  
The United Nations has successfully created international agreements regarding the 
protection of the environment and natural resources, with the 1972 London Convention being 
a standout example. This agreement, formally titled the “Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,” provides a mechanism requiring 
ratifying states to create statutes and regulations to protect the planet’s water resources from 
dumping.321 This convention provides definitions on what activities constitutes dumping. It 
also created authorities to enforce these standards and ensured flagged vessels were equipped 
and able to comply with these standards.322  
The UNCOPUOS should pursue the creation of an international convention to prevent 
future pollution of the orbital environment using the 1972 London Convention as a precedent. 
This convention must contain specific definitions on what actions constitute dumping in orbit, 
require signatory states to create an authority to enforce standards, and update the liability of 
states regarding the collision of commercially owned payloads. The committee should 
examine existing orbital debris mitigation standards along with current research on the debris 
environment to ensure that any standards created are sufficient to cope with the increased 
volume of satellite traffic due to the growth of the commercial satellite and launch industry. 
If the United States is successful in the creation of its own Clean Space Act domestically, this 
act will place the state in a position to act as a global leader in this new initiative. The United 
States at the forefront of such an effort will not only align with domestic space policy calling 
for the nation to lead in international space efforts, but also ensure that U.S. interests are 
protected as much as possible in any such agreement. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis provides evidence that a public–private partnership between NASA and 
the commercial space sector demonstrates the quickest and most cost-effective method to take 
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the necessary step to remediate space debris. To begin this effort, Congressional action is 
needed to provide funding and a legal basis for the program. Just as Congress created 
legislation to protect terrestrial resources, the threat of space debris merits similar action to 
protect U.S. assets in orbit. A Clean Space Act must be passed. Furthermore. this type of direct 
action will enable government agencies to regulate compliance to mitigation standards, the 
lack of which has resulted in the current untenable situation in LEO. Only through a Clean 
Space Act will the United States be able to begin ADR missions and reinforce the necessary 
behaviors from space operators to mitigate this threat. 
The NSpC must work hand in hand with the commercial sector to bring operators into 
compliance with new regulations regarding debris mitigation and ADR requirements in a 
manner that does not financially cripple these companies. Federal regulators and the 
commercial sector have a history of finding common ground to protect the environment in a 
manner that is beneficial to both sides, with the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts being 
examples. Allowing grace periods to develop the necessary capabilities for compliance, 
providing grants or tax incentives to offset developmental costs, and encouraging the 
development of commercial ADR capabilities, the NSpC will increase the sustainability of 
domestic space operations and open up additional revenue streams for commercial operators. 
After Congress and the NSpC build the necessary framework, NASA must utilize the 
proven public–private partnership model to develop a domestic ADR capability. The joint-
funding approach pioneered in the COTS program, which resulted in shorter development 
schedules and lower costs, should be leveraged as well. In addition, NASA must avoid the 
pitfalls of the Constellation program and allow latitude and innovation from commercial 
partners to meet the requirements of the program. This model transformed SpaceX into a 
dominant force in the commercial sector and provided NASA, along with commercial 
customers, with reduced costs to orbit. A similar approach for ADR can ensure U.S. leadership 
in this new marketplace, while providing the most cost-effective solution for ADR customers. 
A domestic ADR marketplace will be constrained until the United States takes the 
lead in pursuing an update to existing international agreements. Foreign ownership of debris 
objects and the challenges it presents threatens the safety of all satellites in orbit, and this 
matter cannot be adequately addressed until amendments are made to Article VIII of the Outer 
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Space Treaty. Furthermore. the United States must pursue new agreements on liability to 
adapt to the growth of the global commercial space sector. Gaining Russian cooperation is a 
key element to the success of any effort to update international agreements regarding debris 
remediation. Not only is Russia a large player in the UNCOPUOS, it is also the owner of a 
significant portion of the debris in critical LEO orbits. The United States must find a way to 
incentivize Russian cooperation in these efforts; otherwise, any ADR efforts will be unable to 
remove enough of the dangerous objects necessary to significantly reduce the risk of a 
catastrophic collision. Through the U.S. State Department, NASA, and the UNCOPUOS, the 
United States must find common ground with Russia in ADR efforts either through 
technology sharing or financial incentives. 
The United States has the financial strength and the technical expertise needed to 
begin ADR development to safeguard critical U.S. assets and services. The nation has relied 
on space operators to adhere to mitigation standards in a voluntary manner. This method, both 
domestically and internationally, has led the debris population to reach a tipping point. Now 
is the time for the United States to take direct action to develop an ADR capability and lead 
an international effort not only to remove existing hazardous debris, but also to do so in a 
manner that will allow for further growth in the U.S. commercial space sector and allow the 
nation to maintain leadership in the space domain. The services and capabilities that U.S. 
satellites provide are too valuable to delay any further in addressing this clear and present 
threat to the nation’s economy and security. 
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